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FRACKING, FEDERALISM, AND PRIVATE GOVERNANCE
Amanda C. Leiter*
The United States is in the midst of a natural gas boom, made possible by advances
in drilling and extraction technologies. There is considerable disagreement about the
relative benefits and costs of the boom, but one thing is certain: it has caught govern-
ments flat-footed. The federal government has done little more than commission a study
of some associated public health and environmental risks and propose regulations for
drilling on federal land. States have moved faster to address natural gas risks, but with
little consistency or transparency.
Numerous private organizations are stepping into the resulting governance gaps
with information-gathering and standards-setting efforts. As this Article documents,
these private organizations are performing the functions once assigned to states in so-
called "laboratory federalism": developing innovative governance approaches and-
perhaps more importantly-catalyzing the horizontal and vertical diffusion of success-
ful governance strategies. In some cases, the likely outcome is a public governance
regime with private origins; in others, private entities are likely to continue to play a
role even as public entities enter the frame, creating a hybrid regime. Both outcomes
highlight the need for process reforms to increase private entities' openness, balance,
and accountability. Familiar administrative procedures followed by public agencies of-
fer one model for such reforms, but at least in the natural gas context, those procedures
may be less effective for private entities than for the public agencies for which they were
designed.
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INTRODUCTION
Improvements in horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies
have increased our ability to recover natural gas and oil from untapped reserves
in shale and "tight" or impermeable sandstone layers miles underground. In his
2012 State of the Union Address, President Obama emphasized the need to
develop these so-called "unconventional"' gas reserves "without putting the
health and safety of our citizens at risk,"2 but that task is proving more chal-
lenging than his easy rhetoric suggests. The natural gas boom is changing rural
landscapes3 across America, bringing the promise of prosperity along with risks
to human health and the environment.
As the boom progresses, and its benefits and risks come into ever-sharper
focus, numerous questions arise about the appropriate governance response:
What public health and environmental risks does the boom pose? Is further
regulation necessary, or are existing laws sufficient? If new laws or regulations
are necessary, what form should they take?
Scholars are beginning to address these questions, 4 with some prescribing
specific law reforms and others debating the appropriate locus for those re-
forms-federal, regional, state, or local government. At present, though, the
debate among these authors remains largely academic. Whatever form the ideal
public governance regime might someday take, the present regime is largely
characterized by federal inaction and by state opacity and heterogeneity. There
is little sign that Congress will soon enact comprehensive legislation governing
shale and tight gas extraction. Moreover, the oil and gas industry benefits from
numerous statutory exceptions that curtail federal agencies' authority to address
I The term "unconventional gas" refers to gas "trapped underground by impermeable rocks, such
as coal, sandstone and shale." FAQs: Natural Gas, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, http://perma.cc/JT5R-
KC2H. This Article concerns only two of the three main types of unconventional gas-shale gas
and tight gas. The third, coal bed methane, is extracted using a somewhat different technology that
is beyond the scope of this Article. For an explanation of the techniques used to extract coal bed
methane, see generally ALL CONSULTING & MONT. BD. OF OIL & GAS CONSERVATION, COAL BED
METHANE PRIMER: NEW SOURCE OF NATURAL GAs-ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS (2004),
http://perma.cc/HQ4Z-UD8L.
2 Press Release, President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address
(Jan. 24, 2012), http://perma.cc/PZ7M-JU3E.
3 Some cities have also seen drastic changes. See, e.g., Increasing Drug Trade, Violence Mar
Positive Effects of Bakken Boom, BILLINGS GAzErrE (Apr. 13, 2014), http://perma.cc/CF6U-
EJAW (describing the increase in crime in and near Williston, ND, accompanying the oil and gas
boom).
' See infra text accompanying notes 74-84.
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natural gas risks under existing environmental and public health laws.' On the
state level, there is considerable legislative and regulatory activity, but much of
it is opaque, and those efforts that are observable are still spotty.6
As a result, there is a significant public governance gap in the natural gas
world and an opening for private governance efforts. Over the last few years,
several large, national, nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") have taken
actions "designed to achieve traditionally governmental ends"7 related to natu-
ral gas development. These private entities' activities range from increasing the
availability of information about extraction techniques and risks to reducing
public health and environmental externalities. For example, the privately run
website FracFocus 8 serves as a clearinghouse for information on the chemicals
used in individual exploration and extraction wells. Several private nonprofits,
involving a range of industry and environmental stakeholders, seek to identify
best practices for all or part of the gas extraction process. Examples include the
American Petroleum Institute ("API"),9 the American Society for Testing and
Materials ("ASTM"), 10 the Center for Sustainable Shale Development
("CSSD"), l the Gas and Preservation Partnership ("GAPP"), 2 and the State
Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental Regulations ("STRONGER"). 3
Lastly, some of these private entities are wrestling with the steps that must
come after standards development: diffusion, implementation, and enforcement
of identified best practices. CSSD, for example, recently announced that it is
accepting applicants for a new, independent, third-party verification program,
which will assess applicants' compliance with CSSD's performance standards
and award compliance certifications. 4
In the environmental arena, as elsewhere, attitudes toward these kinds of
private governance efforts are rarely nuanced. Supporters argue that private
regimes create opportunities for NGOs and industry participants to work to-
gether to identify cost-effective approaches to risk reduction-that is, opportu-
nities to address environmental and health harms while also staving off more
onerous and less carefully tailored government regulation. 5 Supporters also
'See infra text accompanying notes 90, 108-11.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 115-19.
'Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 146
(2013) (defining private environmental governance).
8FRACFOCuS, http://perma.cc/UE6X-LREE.
9 AM. PETROL. INST., OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE/BEST PRACTICES ON HYDRAULIC FRAC-
TURING (HF), (2012) [hereinafter API, OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE], http://perma.cc/
LM5N-XS39.
0 Doug Clauson, Hydraulic Fracturing: New ASTM International Subcommittee to Develop
Needed Standards, ASTM INT'L STANDARDIZATION NEWS (Nov./Dec. 2012), http://perma.cc/
LL7G-Y8CK.
" Performance Standards, CT. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., http://perma.cc/SMS2-H49G.
12 GAS & PRESERVATION P'SHiP, http://perma.cc/X2LA-KXZM.
13 STATE REV. OF OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGULATIONS, http://perma.cc/5W82-9X4J.
14 Certification, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., http://perma.cc/HXT6-G6S5.
1 See generally Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A Functional Typology of Private
Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 67, 77-135 (2011) (identifying the road-
blocks to government regulation of certain risks and the variety of private governance institutions
that arise to fill the resulting regulatory gap).
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emphasize that private regimes can complement or even catalyze development
of public governance strategies. 6 Opponents, by contrast, see any private and
voluntary effort at self-governance as inherently self-serving and suspect
"greenwashing"-industry players' attempt to improve their public images
while staving off government regulation and thus avoiding the costs of real risk
reduction. 7 As always, the reality lies between these extremes and depends on
such factors as the structure of the relevant industry, the adequacy of any fed-
eral or state regulation of the industry, the details of the private governance
regime (such as the inclusion of rigorous compliance mechanisms), 8 and the
characteristics of the risks that the private entity seeks to address.
In exploring these factors, the growing literature on private environmental
governance 9 builds on both public choice insights,20 including such issues as
capture and free riding,2' and work that explores the degree to which states in
our federal system serve as "laborato[ries]" of policy development.22 From
these roots, private environmental governance scholars have offered a typology
6 See id. at 69.
" See, e.g., Dory Hippauf, GREENWASHED Center for Sustainable Shale Development, No
FRACKING WAY (June 13, 2013), http://perma.cc/8N5E-CG5L; Roberts, supra note 15, at 70-71
(noting that when private governance entities "preempt formal regulation and compete with one
another for participants, consumers, investors, and regulatory space," the "[c]onsequences in-
clude 'greenwashing' or misinformation and fraud in meeting consumers' and investors' social and
environmental preferences"). But see Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 137 ("A recent comprehen-
sive review of empirical research on private environmental certification systems . . . finds evi-
dence of substantial positive impacts on corporate environmental behavior at the global and local
levels. This conclusion is consistent with a number of studies of other forms of private environ-
mental governance. The effects on corporate behavior are better established than the effects on
environmental quality, but early indications suggest that some private governance programs have
important effects on environmental quality as well.").
"8 For a discussion about the effectiveness of voluntary compliance programs, see generally Nicole
Darnall & Stephen Sides, Assessing the Performance of Voluntary Environmental Programs: Does
Certification Matter?, 36 POL'Y STUD. J. 95 (2008).
'9 Among the prior works in this area are Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 162, which identifies
those few papers that have addressed the subject of private environmental governance regimes,
including Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029,
2030-32 (2005); Errol Meidinger, Private Import Safety Regulation and Transnational New Gov-
ernance, in IMPORT SAFETY 233 (Coglianese et al. eds., 2009); Eric W. Orts, Climate Contracts,
29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2011); Heather Hughes, Enabling Investment in Environmental Sus-
tainability, 85 IND. L.J. 597 (2010); Annecoos Wiersema, A Train Without Tracks: Rethinking the
Place of Law and Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENvTL. L. 1239
(2008).
2 A thorough review of this important area of scholarship is well beyond the scope of this Article.
For an overview of work on public choice insights, see, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J.
ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009).
21 See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Law as Product and Byproduct, 9 J.L. EcON.
& POL'Y 521, 527 (2013); Roberts, supra note 15, at 77-78 (discussing the breakdown in public
regulatory activity at each stage of the lawmaking process). For further examples of existing work
on these topics, see infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
22 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country."). For a critique of this idea, see, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 594, 610-11 (1980).
For further examples of existing work in this area, see infra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
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of hybrid governance institutions and begun to explore the ways that private
efforts can complement, substitute for, or stymie public efforts to address envi-
ronmental harms.23 In essence, these scholars assert that private entities can
innovate when states do not (or cannot); that these policy innovations can mi-
grate into public law; and finally, that as a result, privately developed policy
innovations can help overcome some dysfunctions of public governance. 24
The natural gas boom offers an unusual opportunity to evaluate these argu-
ments in real time, because there is a public governance gap, and private gov-
ernance efforts are ongoing. As yet, however, there is no systematic exploration
of private entities' work to address the public health and environmental risks of
the boom. 25 This Article begins the discussion.
Part I offers an introduction to the technological complexity of horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing, and the associated public health and environ-
mental risks. Part II then documents the extent of (and gaps in) federal and state
regulatory regimes and introduces the private governance players.26 Part III
briefly reviews the roots and contours of private environmental governance the-
ory, illustrating each concept with examples of private natural gas governance.
Part III also argues that while some private entities have adopted process re-
forms similar to the processes of public agencies, those reforms are unlikely to
be as effective in the private context as they are in the public context.
Part IV then considers the relationship between private and public govern-
ance in the context of the natural gas boom. Theorists have observed that the
efforts of private entities could have either positive or negative spillover effects
for the development of sound public governance. Part IV first outlines those
potential effects and then evaluates which effects are likely to predominate in
23 See, e.g., Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 21, at 525 (discussing ways to use private lawmak-
ing as a solution to the breakdown of public governance); Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 146
(surveying private entities' contributions to environmental governance); Roberts, supra note 15
(offering a typology of private institutions and discussing the varied ways that private entities can
contribute to effective governance); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,
75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 543, 548 (2000) (asserting that governance is a negotiated relationship
between private and public actors); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The
Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104 (1998)
(discussing the perils of transitioning from "command and control" rules to private self-
governance).
24 But see Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 21, at 525 (identifying two reasons why private
lawmaking, too, may not occur at an efficient level).
25 Exceptions include Hannah J. Wiseman, The Private Role in Public Fracturing Disclosure and
Regulation, 3 HARV. Bus. L. REV. ONLINE 49 (2013), perma.cc/z5ML-YFKM, and David B.
Spence, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Oil and Gas Industry: The Importance of Reputa-
tional Risk, 86 CH.-KENT L. REv. 59 (2011). See also Harm M. Osofsky & Hannah Wiseman,
Hybrid Energy Governance, U. ILL. L. RaV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing the Delaware River
Basin Commission's work to address drilling and fracturing risks within the Delaware River
watershed).
26 This Article focuses on the activities of six entities: FracFocus, ASTM, CSSD, STRONGER,
GAPP, and API. This list is representative rather than comprehensive. Other private entities active
on natural gas issues include the Groundwater Protection Council, GROUNDWATER PROT. COUN-
cIL, http://perma.cc/5NS3-6MF3; the Natural Gas Supply Association, NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
Ass'N, http://perma.cc/G85H-RKGW; and various environmental groups, see, e.g., Sierra Club's
Position on Hydraulic Fracturing, SIERRA CLUB ALLEGHENY GRP., http://perma.ccIY54S-3WVJ.
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the gas context. Specifically, Part IV begins by supposing a possible end-state
for hydraulic fracturing governance: a purely public, cooperative federalism
regime, in which the federal government sets minimum standards for safe and
clean gas production, and the states enjoy some leeway to determine how best
to implement those standards. Part IV then considers the extent to which pri-
vate gas governance entities are promoting or could promote development of
such a regime, concluding on a less-than-optimistic note. On the one hand,
private gas governance entities are important sources of new information and
ideas, and they serve as vectors for the broader dissemination of existing infor-
mation and ideas. Our developing gas governance regime thus owes a debt to
the work of these entities. As might be expected, however, there are caveats.
The proliferation of private entities and divergent, privately developed stan-
dards may impede development of a single set of federal minimum standards
for hydraulic fracturing. Then too, even with the reforms noted in Part III, pri-
vate gas governance entities are not particularly well structured to promote
transparency, representativeness, and public accountability. As a result, both
the information they gather and the policy innovations they develop raise fair-
ness and democratic legitimacy concerns.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TECHNOLOGY AND RISKS OF
UNCONVENTIONAL GAS EXTRACTION
To assess the private environmental governance efforts in the natural gas
arena, one must have some background understanding of unconventional gas
extraction technology, the associated environmental and public health risks,
and the extent of federal and state regulatory efforts. After a brief tour of those
issues, Part I concludes with an introduction of six private governance players
now working to address gas risks.
A. The Technology
Contrary to popular opinion, the basic technique of hydraulic fracturing is
far from new. In the mid-1900s, Standard Oil introduced the technique,27 which
involves injecting fluid and additives into the ground to break apart rock forma-
tions (or prop open existing fissures) and improve the flow of hydrocarbons.2 8
The process proved sufficiently effective that industry experts estimate it has
been used in various forms in over one million domestic oil and gas wells in the
intervening decades. 9
27 See Carl T. Montgomery & Michael B. Smith, Hydraulic Fracturing: History of an Enduring
Technology, J. PETRo. TECH., Dec. 2010, at 26, 26.
28 In the early years, companies used crude oil or a blend of crude and gasoline, mixed with sand,
to fracture limestone formations. See id. at 27.29 See Susan L. Brantley & Anna Meyendorff, Op-Ed., The Facts on Fracking, N.Y. TiMEs (Mar.
13, 2013), http://perma.cc/9NLX-7SMB (estimating one million wells have been drilled since the
1940s); About Natural Gas: Hydraulic Fracturing and Horizontal Drilling, EXXONMOBIL, http://
perma.cc/YW5P-QWED (stating more than one million wells have been drilled in the last sixty
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In recent years, however, the pace of hydraulic fracturing has drastically
increased due to technological breakthroughs that allow application of the basic
technique to release natural gas and oil from porous, but relatively impermea-
ble, shale or tight sandstone ("tight sands") layers deep underground. The mod-
em process, known as "slickwater" fracturing,30 varies depending on location,
geology, and other factors. In general terms, extraction companies now have
the ability to employ computerized, 3-D imaging tools to locate gas deposits
and natural fractures in thin, horizontal, shale or tight sands layers more than a
mile underground;" drill vertical wells down to those layers;32 turn remotely-
controlled, diamond-studded drill bits; and then drill horizontally through the
shale or tight sands layers for thousands of feet perpendicular to the original
well. 33
After each phase of the drilling, casing-a series of steel drill pipes, each
over thirty-feet long-is inserted into the hole and cemented into place 4.3 Each
casing must be inserted through the one above it, so these casings necessarily
get successively smaller in diameter as the well deepens. When all stages of
drilling are complete, the result is a closed, approximately-L-shaped series of
telescoping drill casings, cemented into a hole that, in many cases, extends
several miles vertically into and then horizontally through the ground.
In a typical shale or tight gas well, the drilling company then uses explo-
sive charges to perforate the steel casing in short sections of the horizontal
portion of the well, in areas where data collected during drilling indicates that
the impermeable layer surrounding the well is saturated with gas or oil. Next is
the step that most captures the public imagination and raises fears: the "frac
job," in which huge volumes of water-on the order of four and a half million
gallons for a well in the Marcellus region in the northeastern United States, for
example 3-are pumped down the well, out through the perforations in the cas-
years). See also Montgomery & Smith, supra note 27, at 26 (indicating that 2.5 million wells have
been hydraulically fractured worldwide over the same time period).
3 Hannah Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. CoLo. L. REv. 729, 753-54
(2013) ("[A]lthough fracturing is an old practice, it is distinctly new in two important ways. First,
the specific practice of slickwater hydraulic fracturing has introduced new processes to old frac-
turing techniques. Higher water use in fracturing requires, for example, larger water withdraw-
als .... Second, slickwater fracturing has enabled the development of thousands of new oil and
gas wells in the United States." (citations omitted)).
31 In the Marcellus Shale, for example, "vertical drilling ranges from 5,000 to 9,000 feet below
ground." Resources: Maps and Graphics, PENN STATE MARCELLUS CTR. FOR OUTREACH & RES.,
http://perma.cc/7CZ7-475U.
3" Some characterize these layers as the fossil fuel-saturated "filling in [the] Oreo cookie" of
bedrock. Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic
Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 154 (2013).
13 See, e.g., ALEX TREMBATH ET AL., BREAKTHROUGH INST., WHERE THE SHALE GAS REVOLUTION
CAME FROM: GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN SHALE
(2012), http://perma.cc/S2MM-XJGE.
" GEORGE E. KING, SoC'Y OF PETROL. ENG'RS, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 101: WHAT EVERY REP-
RESENTATIVE, ENVIRONMENTALIST, REGULATOR, REPORTER, INVESTOR, UNIVERSITY RESEARCHER,
NEIGHBOR, AND ENGINEER SHOULD KNow ABOUT ESTIMATING FRAC RISK AND IMPROVING FRAC
PERFORMANCE IN UNCONVENTIONAL GAS AND On WELLS (2012), http://perma.cc/GQW9-6YEG.
" Jesse Jenkins, Energy Facts: How Much Water Does Fracking for Shale Gas Consume?, THE
ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Apr. 6, 2013), http://perma.cc/ZK5C-XC7P.
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ing, and into the surrounding shale or tight sands, where the pressurized fluid
fractures the rock.36
To improve the flow of hydrocarbons through the resulting fissures, the
drilling company mixes additives into this water, including chemicals to control
the growth of bacteria and scales in the well, fine sand or other particulate
"proppants" to prop open the cracks in the shale once the water is withdrawn,
and lubricants37 to make the water flow more easily under pressure.38 The basic
formulation of slickwater for shales includes about 98-99% water, 1-2% prop-
pants, and less than 0.1% chemical additives of various sorts. 39
After the rock is fractured, the pumps are turned off. At this point, the well
can be temporarily abandoned if economic conditions persuade the production
company to wait to produce the gas. Temporary abandonment involves plug-
ging the well with cement that can readily be drilled if and when the price of
gas rises to a point that production is feasible.
When the production company is ready to produce gas from the well, ac-
tivity shifts to the "production phase," which is largely automated. The com-
pany restores the ground around the drilling site, leaving some processing
equipment at the wellhead, along with oil or gas collection lines to transport the
product away from the well.40 The typical onsite equipment includes a system
of tubes and valves, known as a "Christmas tree," which controls the flow of
gas.
Importantly, both the frac job and the production phase produce considera-
ble wastewater. Initially, when the drill pumps are turned off, the underground
rock formation "relaxes" and manmade fractures close to the extent allowed by
the proppant. This process drives a large volume of "flowback" water out of
the well.41 In addition, over the life of the well, production of gas generates a
waste stream, generally known as "produced water." Both waste streams com-
prise the water and chemicals that were pumped down the well during fractur-
ing, additional water that had been trapped in the formation, salt, hydrocarbons,
naturally occurring radioactive material ("NORM"), and other compounds
from the formation. 42
Next is the "processing" step, which involves separating the gas from any
water or other impurities prior to compressing and transporting it (via pipeline)
36 See generally Graham Roberts, Mika Grbndal & Bill Marsh, Extracting Natural Gas from Rock,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2011), http://perma.cc/JA7Q-VLDP.
17 The lubricants are the source of the term "slickwater" fracturing that is sometimes used to
describe this process. See KING, supra note 34, at 7.
" See, e.g., Chemical Use in Hydraulic Fracturing, FRACFocus, http://perma.cc/5VZG-L25M.39 Id.
' See Wiseman, supra note 30, at 757; see also Completed Well Pads and Equipment, ENCANA,
http://perma.cc/5T58-BWR3.
4' Email from Richard Sears, Consulting Professor, Stanford University, to author (Aug. 22, 2013)
(on file with author). Only a fraction of the introduced volume flows back, however-as little as
5% in the Haynesville Shale on the Gulf Coast, and up to as much as 50% in the Marcellus. The
remainder of the water is trapped and held in the small pores and microfractures of the shale deep
underground. See KING, supra note 34, at 10.
42 See KING, supra note 34, at 10.
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to its ultimate destination.43 Finally, when the well is drawn down to the point
that production is no longer economical, permanently closing or "abandoning"
it requires removal of the remaining equipment and insertion of a more perma-
nent type of cement that will, in theory, withstand the test of time-the ravages
of water and ice, any seismic activity, and any future human activities around
the well site (including future well-drilling efforts).44
B. The Risks
The rewards of this technologically extraordinary process are significant
and largely self-evident. The promise of unconventional extraction techniques
enabled the United States to increase its estimated natural gas reserves 45 by
75% in just seven years, from 2004 to 2011.46 The U.S. Energy Information
Administration projects that domestic gas production 47 will increase by 44%
between 2011 and 2040, due almost entirely to expanded shale gas extraction.48
Industry proponents tout the new jobs this production will support, the advan-
tages of domestic energy production in light of current political realities in the
Middle East,49 and, not least, the environmental benefits of natural gas itself,
which bums more completely and cleanly than coal.50
41 Well Completion, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://perma.ccMJL4-PV9P.
4 See generally J. Daniel Arthur et al., Plugging and Abandonment of Oil and Gas Wells (Nat'l
Petrol. Council N. Am. Res. Dev. Study, Working Document Paper No. 2-25, 2011), http://perma
.cc/4TGM-B3ZH (describing the risks posed by abandoned wells and some steps that can be taken
at the time of abandonment to reduce those risks).
4' The Energy Information Administration defines natural gas "reserves" as the "[e]stimated
quantities of [natural gas] that analysis of geologic and engineering data demonstrates with rea-
sonable certainty are recoverable under existing economic and operating conditions. The location,
quantity, and grade of the energy source are usually considered to be well established in such
reserves." Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://perma.cc/6VMJ-LDUD.
46 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas: A Long Bridge to a Promising Destination, 32 UTAH ENVTh.
L. REV. 245, 246 (2012).
" The Energy Information Administration defines natural gas "production" as the "[t]he volume
of natural gas withdrawn from reservoirs less" volumes that are returned to the reservoirs or are
otherwise not salable for various reasons. Glossary, supra note 45.
48 See Energy in Brief: What Is Shale Gas and Why Is It Important?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://perma.cc/4Z6L-SLS3.
" The White House itself makes this argument. See, e.g., Jason Furman & Gene Sperling, Reduc-
ing America's Dependence on Foreign Oil as a Strategy to Increase Economic Growth and Re-
duce Economic Vulnerability, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 29, 2013), http://perma.cc/C3LT-
9K8T. Importantly, though, natural gas and oil serve very different purposes in our current econ-
omy; we rely on natural gas to produce electricity and foreign oil to power our transportation
sector. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVrEW 2011, at 37 fig.2.0
(2012), http://perma.cc/R95-7YNA (indicating that in 2011, petroleum supplied 93% of the energy
used by the U.S. transportation sector, while natural gas supplied only 3%). Unless we radically
increase the percentage of natural gas-fueled cars and trucks on American roads (as the White
House seems to advocate, see Furman & Sperling, supra), natural gas is more likely to displace
domestic coal rather than petroleum. See, e.g., Marin Katusa, Shale Gas Takes on Coal to Power
America's Electrical Plants, FORBES (May 30, 2012), http://perma.cc[U6BD-6976.
50 See, e.g., Natural Gas and the Environment, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://perma.cc/B958-KXYP
("Natural gas is the cleanest of all the fossil fuels .... Composed primarily of methane, the main
products of the combustion of natural gas are carbon dioxide and water vapor, the same com-
pounds we exhale when we breathe. Coal and oil are composed of much more complex molecules,
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Significant uncertainty surrounds these alleged benefits, but even more
contentious and uncertain are the public health and environmental risks of the
resulting natural gas boom, some of which may not yet be evident. Thus far, the
public discussion of these risks has largely centered on one stage of well devel-
opment-the frac job itself, during which large volumes of pressurized water
and chemicals are injected into the ground to fracture previously impermeable
rock layers, thereby creating a potential conduit for groundwater pollution."
That focus is natural given the terminology. Phrases like "horizontal drilling"
and "hydraulic fracturing" conjure vivid images of man-made cracks through
which contaminants like gas and oil can flow up from the depths and into our
drinking water supplies. To some degree, industry opponents have played on
those fears, abbreviating "hydraulic fracturing" not to "fracing," as the indus-
try prefers, but to "fracking," a negative-sounding "slur" that "'obviously
calls to mind other less socially polite terms.' ' '5 2 At the same time, industry
proponents have also benefited from the public focus on the risks associated
with fluid injection, because that narrow focus has distracted attention from the
health and environmental threats posed by other stages of gas development, and
by the sheer magnitude of the gas boom.
In fact, risks arise not only during the fluid injection or fracturing stage of
unconventional gas extraction, but also at all other exploration and well-devel-
opment steps, "including constructing a well pad and access road, drilling and
casing (lining) a well, and storing and disposing of drilling and fracturing
wastes, among many other steps."53 Research into these risks is underway all
over the country, with risks observed in at least eight categories: water use,
water pollution, air pollution, climate change, worker health and safety, earth-
quake safety, land and wildlife disruption, and community dislocation.
Water use issues principally arise in arid areas such as the desert South-
west,5 4 where drilling competes with agricultural and municipal water uses, and
may stress aquatic ecosystems.5 Water pollution, meanwhile, follows two prin-
cipal pathways. First, if fracturing chemicals or diesel fuels spill, or the large
[which] means that when combusted, coal and oil release higher levels of harmful emissions,
including ... nitrogen oxides (NOx), . . sulfur dioxide (S02) ... [and] ash particles .... The
combustion of natural gas, on the other hand, releases very small amounts of sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides, virtually no ash or particulate matter, and lower levels of carbon dioxide, carbon
monoxide, and other reactive hydrocarbons.").
SI See Wiseman, supra note 30, at 736.
2 Jonathan Fahey, No Energy Industry Backing for the Word Fracking', YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 26,
2012), http://perma.cc/HA69-D8K2 (quoting Kate Sinding, Senior Attorney at the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council).
13 See generally Wiseman, supra note 30, at 736 (detailing risks at all stages of tight gas
development).
54 Water use also can temporarily stress aquatic life even in water-rich areas, if too many water
withdrawals occur in a short space of time. See, e.g., Press Release, Susquehanna River Basin
Commission, 37 Water Withdrawals for Natural Gas Drilling and Other Uses Suspended to Protect
Streams (June 28, 2012), http://perma.cc/C85V-M6BT (announcing the suspension of "37 sepa-
rate water withdrawals ... due to localized streamflow levels dropping throughout the Susque-
hanna basin").
15 VIKRAM RAO, SHALE GAS: THE PROMISE AND THE PERIL 45-50 (2012); Wiseman, supra note
30, at 776.
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quantities of flowback and produced water are improperly stored or otherwise
mishandled, then the resulting runoff can contaminate surface water bodies.56
Second, if drilling fluids or hydrocarbons migrate through existing or man-
made rock fractures (as some fear57) or leak from ground storage pits or im-
properly sealed wells (perhaps a more realistic and serious eventuality"), those
contaminants may leak into groundwater aquifers.5 9
Air pollution, too, can be a significant issue in areas of heavy drilling,
where heavy diesel trucks come and go, drilling machinery runs constantly,
volatile organic compounds evaporate from onsite storage tanks, and escaping
hydrocarbons must be either vented to the atmosphere or "flared" (that is,
burned as they leave the well head). 6° Thus air and water pollution both pose an
obvious threat to the health and welfare of nearby populations, depending on
the nature and quantity of the pollutants. 61
The climate change consequences of the natural gas boom are heavily de-
bated. Indeed, some put climate consequences on the "benefit" side of natural
gas's balance sheet, touting "the low carbon content of natural gas relative to
other fossil fuels" and arguing that, as a result, natural gas could serve as "a
'bridge' to a low-carbon future."62 Others counter, though, that devoting re-
sources to improving the infrastructure for natural gas development, transport,
and use could reduce investment in alternative energy technologies, which have
even smaller climate footprints. 63 Moreover, if significant amounts of unburned
56 To give just one example, any wastewater held on site must be stored in a waste pond that is
well lined (to prevent seepage) and adequately constructed (to prevent leakage during flooding
events).
17 See, e.g., Chris Tackett, Natural Gas: 6 to 12 Percent of the Methane Produced is Leaking,
Study Finds, TREEHUGER (Aug. 9, 2013), http://perma.cc[YKK3-PUX7.
58 See, e.g., Richard Fausset & Neela Banerijee, Tests Warned of Cement Problems Before Well's
Blowout: BP and Halliburton Were Aware of Them But Used It Anyway, an Investigative Commis-
sion Reports, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2010), http://perma.cc/SXL6-KALF (citing findings of Presi-
dent Obama's special commission investigating the BP Deepwater Horizon spill); NEW MEXICO
OIL CONSERVATION Div., CASES WHERE PIT SUBSTANCES CONTAMINATED NEW MEXICO's
GROUNDWATER (2008), http://perma.cc/M2TU-3K35.
19 RAO, supra note 55, at 35-44; Wiseman, supra note 30, at 770-75 (mishandling of flowback
and produced water), 783-88 (improper casing), 761-65 (surface chemical spills); EPA's Study of
Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources,
EPA, http://perma.cc/N4AQ-PGRZ.
6 See Wiseman, supra note 30, at 805-07; Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance
Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg.
49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63); Mead Gruver, Wyoming Air
Pollution Worse Than Los Angeles Due to Gas Drilling, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2011), http://
perma.cc/Y5QS-4UYH.
61 See, e.g., David Kelly, Study Shows Air Emissions Near Fracking Sites May Pose Health Risk,
CU NEWSROOM (Mar. 19, 2012), http://perma.cc/N2U9-CFAE.
62 MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE, THE FUTURE OF NATURAL GAS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY 1
(2011), http://perma.cc/DNP9-W8NR.
63 See Richard Harris, Could Cheap Gas Slow Growth of Renewable Energy?, NPR (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://perma.cc/TA52-9Y22 (quoting Henry Jacoby, an economist at the Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy Research at MIT, who warns "'we have to keep our eye on the ball long-
term.' . . . Wind and solar power are more expensive than natural gas, and though those prices
have been coming down, they're chasing a moving target that has fallen fast: natural gas. 'It makes
the prospects for large-scale expansion of those technologies more chancy.'"). See also RAo,
supra note 55, at 122-28.
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methane leak into the atmosphere during well drilling, well completion, gas
transport, or gas use, that leakage could undermine or even erase the supposed
benefits of gas as a bridge fuel.64 Individual molecules of methane ("CH4") trap
warming radiation far more effectively than the carbon dioxide molecules
("C0 2") produced when coal and, to a lesser extent, gas are burned: "the com-
parative impact of [atmospheric] CH4 on climate change is over 20 times
greater than [that of CO2] over a 100-year period. ' '65
As for worker health and safety, risks arise at all stages of gas production.
They range from familiar occupational hazards, such as traffic and worksite
accidents, to exposure to hazardous materials used on site or produced from
deep underground. 66 There is also developing evidence that workers exposed to
the fine sand used as a proppant face an increased risk of the serious lung
disease silicosis.67
Natural gas exploration and production activities may also pose a risk of
increased earthquake activity. A recent Science article suggests that while the
well-drilling and hydraulic-fracturing processes pose only "a low risk of induc-
ing destructive earthquakes," the common practice of disposing of flowback
and produced water by injecting them into existing deep wells "can induce
larger earthquakes. '68 Indeed, "several of the largest earthquakes in the U.S.
midcontinent in 2011 and 2012 may have been triggered by nearby [waste-
water] disposal wells," including a "magnitude 5.6 event in central Oklahoma
that destroyed 14 homes and injured two people. '69
Then there is the land and wildlife disruption that results from the con-
struction of well pads and access roads, and the installation of distribution pipe-
' There is a heated debate about the extent of this leakage. Compare Anna Karion et al., Methane
Emissions Estimate from Airborne Measurements over a Western United States Natural Gas Field,
40 GEOPHYS. RES. LETTERS 4393 (2013) (estimating considerable leakage), and Robert W. How-
arth, Renee Santoro & Anthony Ingraffea, Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural
Gas from Shale Formations: A Letter, CLIMATIC CHANGE (Mar. 13, 2011), http://perma.cc/A5CU-
JXDE, with Philip Bump, The EPA Just Shook Up the Debate Over Fracking, ATLANTIC WInE
(Apr. 29, 2013), http://perma.cc/T48Y-W9KB ("New estimates from the EPA indicate that meth-
ane leakage from. natural gas production is substantially lower than previously believed."). The
most recent scholarly contribution to this debate is decidedly ambivalent, finding higher emissions
than the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") found, but nevertheless asserting that
"system-wide [methane] leakage is unlikely to be large enough to negate climate benefits of coal-
to-[natural gas] substitution." Adam R. Brandt et al., Methane Leaks from North American Natu-
ral Gas Systems, 343 SCIENCE 733, 733 (2014).
65 Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Methane Emissions, EPA, http://perma.cc/D6HT-ZM28.
6 See generally Robert Iafolla, Four Fatalities Linked to Used Fracking Fluid Exposure During
'Flowback,'NIOSH Reports, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 20, 2014), http://perma.cc/M5RY-QPZA;
John L. Adgate et al., Public Health Risks of Shale Gas Development, CATSKILL CITIZENS FOR
SAFE ENERGY (May 17, 2013), http://perma.cc/7R3F-SRVR.
" See RESEARCH TRIANGLE ENVTL. HEALTH COLLABORATIVE, SHALE GAS EXTRACTION IN NORTH
CAROLINA: PUBLIC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS 12 (2012), http://perma.cc/C4SR-LVU9; Nell Green-
fieldboyce, Sand from Fracking Could Pose Lung Disease Risk to Workers, NPR SHOTS (Mar. 29,
2013), http://perma.cc/HYX7-D465.
68 William Ellsworth, Injection-Induced Earthquakes, 341 SCIENCE 142 (2013), http://perma.cc/
LZP5-W2UB (quotations appear in Structured Abstract in online version only).
69 Id. See also Katie M. Keranen et al., Potentially Induced Earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links
Between Wastewater Injection and the 2011 Mw 5.7 Earthquake Sequence, 41 GEOLOGY 699
(2013).
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lines. These activities can create a visible blight,70 contribute to soil erosion if
stormwater runoff is not properly managed, serve as a pathway for introduction
of invasive species,7' and threaten cultural and historic sites. 72
Finally, although the gas boom is revitalizing the economy in some towns
and rural counties, the benefits are not always equally distributed and may
come with a high cost to the local community. To take just one example, in the
small town of Towanda, Pennsylvania, there are now "numerous high-paying
drilling jobs," but "many residents lack the skills for them .... Narrow country
roads are crumbling under the weight of heavy trucks. With housing scarce and
expensive, more residents are becoming homeless. Local services and infra-
structure are strained. ' 73
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO GAS GOVERNANCE EFFORTS
A. The Scope of Public Governance
As scholars and regulators learn more about the implications of the gas
boom, they are beginning to recommend expansion of both research and regula-
tory efforts beyond the "frac job" itself to the full array of extraction activities
and associated risks.74 They are also identifying policy reforms to address these
broader risks, and debating the level of government at which these reforms
should be implemented: federal, regional, state, or local.
Wrestling with the issue of water pollution risks, for example, Thomas W.
Merrill and David M. Schizer suggest that an ideal regulatory program would
combine (a) information-forcing disclosure requirements, (b) dynamic "best
practices regulations" and (c) a set of default liability rules designed to en-
courage regulatory compliance, such as a presumptive defense to tort liability
70 In this instance, a picture is worth a thousand words. A recent U.S. Geological Survey publica-
tion includes a striking picture of a once-forested landscape in McKean County, Pennsylvania,
that is now crisscrossed with "roads, well pads, and pipelines related to natural gas development."
E. TERRY SLONECKER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, LANDSCAPE CONSEQUENCES OF NATU-
RAL GAS EXTRACTION IN BRADFORD AND WASHINGTON COUNTIES, PENSYLVANIA, 2004-2010 3
fig.2 (2012), http://perma.cc/XX97-CX9N.
"' Wiseman, supra note 30, at 795-96.
72 GAS & PRES. P'SHIP, FINAL REPORT FROM THE TASK FORCE ON CULTURAL RESOURCE COMPLI-
ANCE AND SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS (2013), http://perma.cc/4HCF-NYWM.
73 Katharine Q. Seelye, Gas Boom Aids Pennsylvania, but Some Worry over the Risk, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 14, 2011), http://perma.cc/TS43-FG5N. See also Scott Detrow, Five Years into Fracking
Boom, One Pa. Town at a Turning Point, NPR (Jan. 14, 2013), http://perma.cc/ZX7H-EDYF
("You want to know how natural gas drilling has changed Towanda, Pennsylvania? Start with
traffic. That's the first thing everyone who lives here will tell you about .... Police Chief Randy
Epler says his force has had its hands full .. .[with increased] DUIs, bar fights, [and] domestic
issues .... And rent soared too."). Professor Hannah Wiseman recently documented these and
other risks based on a comprehensive review of recent violations of state environmental regula-
tions at oil and gas sites in four heavy-drilling states. See Wiseman, supra note 30, at 747-53
nn.83-84 (surveying data on administrative violations from Louisiana, Michigan, New Mexico,
and Texas).
74 Wiseman, supra note 30, at 808-15.
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for companies that meet all applicable practice standards." They further advise
"keeping the regulatory center of gravity in the states" to "ensure that the
regulatory regime is both dynamic and tailored to local conditions."76 David
Spence, too, recommends that federal regulators allow the "process of learning
and [regulatory] adaptation [to] play out mostly in the states"" because, in his
view, most environmental externalities from unconventional gas development
"are experienced locally," and those that cross state boundaries are, to a signif-
icant extent, "already adequately addressed by federal law. 78
Other authors advocate a larger role for the federal government in address-
ing natural gas risks. Michael Burger, for example, notes that Spence's focus on
the local effects of individual shale or tight gas operations ignores both the
scale of the nationwide gas boom and the cumulative impacts of that boom on
the "cultural and historic landscape" of "rural and small town America."79 For
Burger, those considerations are sufficient to render unconventional gas drilling
a "matter of true, national concern."80 Likewise, Robin Kundis Craig, Jody
Freeman, and Hannah Wiseman see a central role for the federal government.
Kundis Craig argues that the impacts of hydraulic fracturing on both water
quantity and water quality obligate the federal government to play a "more
dominant role" in policy development.8' Freeman touts the advantages of a co-
operative federalism regime, in which the federal government sets baseline per-
formance standards, but allows states some flexibility in deciding how to meet
them.82 Wiseman makes a similar point, and further suggests that a federal en-
tity could maintain a clearinghouse of information on state laws and industry
performance standards, "to assist states in identifying the best regulatory op-
tions, . . . remind the laggards of areas where improvement is needed and
demonstrate the many variations in risk response. '83 Wiseman and Osofsky
also note the advantages of a regional governance approach, and of hybrid gov-
71 Merrill & Schizer, supra note 32, at 201-27.76 Id. at 151.
77 David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Produc-
tion, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 508 (2013).
78 Id. at 492-93.
" Michael Burger, Response: Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 150,
162-63 (2013).
I d. at 159 (emphasis added).
8' Robin Kundis Craig, Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), Federalism, and the Water-Energy
Nexus, 49 IDAHo L. REV. 241, 260 (2013).
82 Jody Freeman, Op-Ed., The Wise Way to Regulate Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2012),
http://perma.cc/YUM8-RVVB. Under this sort of "cooperative federalism" scheme-already in
place in other contexts, including in the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1234-1328 (2012), which governs coal mining-the states "might be required to develop com-
prehensive [risk management] plans . . . based on best practices for disclosure, drilling location,
well construction and wastewater treatment. States would implement and enforce the rules and
issue and oversee the operating permits. The federal government could step in if states abdicated
their responsibility." Freeman, supra.
83 See Wiseman, supra note 30, at 736 ("[T]he debate has tended to focus on whether or not the
injection of water and chemicals underground-the only stage of the process that is technically
described as 'fracturing'-pollutes groundwater.").
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emance organizations that "combine authority from more than one level of
government," as well as from both public and private institutions. 4
Some of the reforms suggested by scholars are already underway-partic-
ularly the broadening of regulatory focus away from the actual fracturing of
rock layers and toward the full complement of natural gas risks. On the re-
search front, for instance, both federal and state entities have recently under-
taken studies that take a broad view of gas risks,85 and Maryland has imposed a
de facto statewide moratorium on all shale and tight gas development pending
completion of a full environmental review.8 6
Yet conspicuous public governance gaps remain. Consider Congress: apart
from committee hearings87 and a 2009 request that the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency ("EPA") study the relationship between hydraulic fracturing
and drinking water,88 the most recent significant congressional action with re-
spect to unconventional gas extraction was deregulatory. In 2005, Congress
passed the Energy Policy Act,89 which includes language specifically exempting
most kinds of hydraulic fracturing from the Safe Drinking Water Act's
("SDWA") otherwise pervasive regulation of any "subsurface emplacement of
fluids by well injection."90 Since then, House and Senate members have intro-
duced several versions of a Fracturing Responsibility and Awareness of Chemi-
cals ("FRAC") Act that would repeal the exemption and require some
disclosure of the chemical constituents of fracturing fluids, but the bills have
84Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 25, at 4.
85 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT: SUPPLEMENTAL GE-
NERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS, AND SOLUTION MINING REGULA-
TORY PROGRAM (2011) (surveying impacts of natural gas development in New York State on
water resources, ecosystems and wildlife, air quality, greenhouse gas emissions, seismicity,
human communities, and transportation infrastructure); Gabrielle Ptron et al., Hydrocarbon
Emissions Characterization in the Colorado Front Range: A Pilot Study, 117 J. GEOPHYSICAL
RES. D04304 (2012) (using air pollution readings from a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration observation tower north of Denver to document methane leakage from oil and gas
fields in northeastern Colorado).
86 See Darryl Fears, Maryland Inches Closer to Decision Time on Hydraulic Fracturing, WASH.
POST (Dec. 8, 2012), http://perma.cc/CX9W-8LE3 (indicating that under an executive order issued
by Governor O'Malley, the Maryland Department of the Environment may not approve drilling
permits until 2014, when a costly statewide study of drilling impacts is due to be completed,
unless other data prove drilling safe sooner).
87 See, e.g., Shale Development: Best Practices and Environmental Concerns: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., 113th Cong. (2013), http://perma.cc/YHV3-JQUK;
Marcellus Shale Gas: Field Hearing before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., 112th Cong.
(2011), http://perma.cc/2ZDM-FLFY; Shale Gas and Water Impacts: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Water and Power of the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Res., 112th Cong. (2011), http:/
/perma.cc/V8BN-WVMC.
88 See H.R. REP. No. 111-316, at 109 (2009) (Conf. Rep.).
89 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005).
90 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(l) (2012). As amended, SDWA's definition of "underground injection"
now reads: "For purposes of this part ... the term 'underground injection'-(A) means the subsur-
face emplacement of fluids by well injection; and (B) excludes- . . . (ii) the underground injec-
tion of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing
operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities." Id. The underground disposal
of fracturing fluid remains regulated under the Act, but the initial injection of fluid during the
"frac job" is unregulated unless diesel fuel is included in the frac fluid. Id.
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died quietly in committee. 9' In 2013, Representatives Cartwright and Polis in-
troduced the Focused Reduction of Effluence and Stormwater runoff through
Hydrofracking Environmental Regulation ("FRESHER") Act,92 the Closing
Loopholes and Ending Arbitrary and Needless Evasion of Regulations
("CLEANER") Act of 2013, 9 3 and the Bringing Reductions to Energy's Air-
borne Toxic Health Effects ("BREATHE") Act,9 4 to close gas production loop-
holes in water, toxic waste, and air regulations, respectively. All three bills
were referred to the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, and
as of November 2014, no further action had been taken. 95
Federal agencies have been somewhat more proactive, at least in recent
years. 96 For example, the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), which over-
sees "700 million subsurface acres of Federal mineral estate and 56 million
subsurface acres of Indian mineral estate," has proposed a rule to govern hy-
draulic fracturing operations on federal and Indian land.97 Among other things,
that rule would require operators to (a) disclose the chemicals in their fracturing
fluids; 98 (b) monitor cement integrity to ensure that wells are adequately sealed
to prevent leakage; 99 (c) map expected rock fractures to ensure they do not
threaten underwater aquifers;100 and (d) use lined pits to store wastewater from
fracturing operations. 1 1
EPA has undertaken the aforementioned study of drinking water im-
pacts, 102 announced a plan to develop wastewater effluent guidelines for oil and
gas extraction,0 3 and initiated a process to obtain public input on what informa-
9' See H.R. 1921, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 1135, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 1084, 112th Cong.
(2011); S. 587, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1215, 111 th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2766, 11 1th Cong. (2009).
92 H.R. 1175, 113th Cong. (2013). Bill tracking information for the FRESHER Act is available
online at Congress.gov. H.R. 1175 - FRESHER Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, http://perma.cc/
4GT7-E6UQ.
93 H.R. 2825, 113th Cong. (2013). Bill tracking for the CLEANER Act is available online at
Congress.gov, H.R. 2825 - CLEANER Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOv, http://perma.cc/H63A-M3UB.
94 H.R. 1154, 113th Cong. (2013). Bill tracking for the BREATHE Act is available online at
Congress.gov, H.R. 1154 - BREATHE Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOv, http://perma.cc/VU3X-LBLE.
" See supra notes 92-94 (bill tracking searches reveal no action as of November 2014).
96 But see Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas
Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 133-34 (2009)
(noting that in a 2004 report, EPA somewhat questionably concluded that "the injection of hydrau-
lic fracturing fluids into [coalbed methane] wells poses little or no threat to [underground sources
of drinking water] and does not justify additional study at this time" (quoting EPA, EVALUATION
OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF
COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS, ES-2 (2004), http://perma.cc/BW3A-HFTQ)).
9" Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,636, 31,636
(proposed May 24, 2013) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160).
" Id. at 31,659 (explaining the disclosure requirement). To satisfy industry commenters that criti-
cized an earlier version of the proposal, the current proposal includes broad exemptions for trade
secrets. Id. at 31,659-60.
I ld. at 31,651-54 (explaining the cement monitoring and logging requirements).
"o Id. at 31,648-49 (requiring submission of map marked with estimated fracture direction,
length, and height).
101 Id. at 31,655 (detailing wastewater storage requirements).
"02 See generally EPA 's Study of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas and Its Potential Impact on
Drinking Water Resources, EPA, http://perma.cc/N4AQ-PGRZ.
"o3 Natural Gas Extraction - Hydraulic Fracturing, EPA, http://perma.cc/MLV4-HECR. The pro-
posed rule to amend the Clean Water Act effluent limitation guidelines for the Oil and Gas Extrac-
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tion about hydraulic fracturing chemicals should be reported under the Toxic
Substances Control Act. °4 In addition, the Agency has issued rules governing
methane and hazardous air pollutant emissions from gas drilling sites. 05
A few other federal agency efforts also bear mention: scientists from the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") have been
working with others at the University of Colorado to study atmospheric meth-
ane emissions around drilling sites;' °6 and the U.S. Department of State is en-
gaged in an effort to share U.S. successes and failures in unconventional gas
exploration, production, and risk mitigation to assist other countries that are
beginning to exploit their own gas resources. 1 7
Federal agencies are hamstrung, however, by the oil and gas industry's
many longstanding exemptions from federal environmental and public health
laws and regulations. The 2005 SDWA exemption affords a striking example, 108
but there are several other areas in which Congress and the agencies have his-
torically treated the industry with kid gloves. Decades ago, for instance, Con-
gress and EPA chose to exclude oil and gas field wastes-which include natural
gas drilling fluids and other production wastes-from the nation's "cradle to
grave" hazardous waste handling, transport, storage, and disposal statute, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). 0 9 Likewise, until re-
cently, EPA had declined to wield its Clean Air Act regulatory authority as
aggressively as it might have. In 2007, the Bush Administration issued a mem-
orandum interpreting preexisting EPA regulations to preclude aggregation of a
single company's multiple, geographically dispersed gas wells into a single
"major source"-a move that would have expanded the reach of the Clean Air
Act's New Source Review and Title V permitting requirements." 0 Less than
three years later, the Obama Administration withdrew that memorandum and
tion Category is scheduled for publication later this year. See Unconventional Extraction in the Oil
and Gas Industry, EPA, http://perma.cc/8XAC-LPY7.
"o See Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals and Mixtures, 79 Fed. Reg. 28,664 (proposed May 19,
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. I).
"' See Oil and Natural Gas Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63).
'06 GABRIELLE PETRON ET AL., ESTIMATION OF EMISSIONS FROM OIL AND NATURAL GAS OPERA-
TIONS IN NORTHEASTERN COLORADO (2012), http://perma.cc/JK72-PQET.
017 See generally Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement Program (UGTEP), U.S. DEP'r OF
STATE, http://perma.cc/VMZ8-Q5XK.
08 See infra notes 217-25.
1°942 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2012) (excluding "drilling fluids, produced waters, and other
wastes associated with the exploration, development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or
geothermal energy" from strict regulation under RCRA Subtitle C, pending a determination by
EPA that such regulation was necessary); Regulatory Determination for Oil and Gas and Geother-
mal Exploration, Development and Production Wastes, 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446, 25,447 (July 6, 1988)
(declining to make that determination). See generally James R. Cox, Revisiting RCRA's Oilfield
Waste Exemption as to Certain Hazardous Oilfield Exploration and Production Wastes, 14 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2003) (detailing the history of the exemption).
"o See Memorandum from William L. Wehrum, Acting Assistant Adm'r, EPA, to Reg'l Adm'rs, on
Source Determinations for Oil and Gas Industries (Jan. 12, 2007), http://perma.cc/EB28-56LY. See
also Robin Bravender, EPA Tosses Bush-Era 'Aggregation' Policy for Oil and Gas Industry, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2009), http://perma.cc/7Q3U-KH2L (describing the memorandum).
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announced that it read the same regulations to allow such aggregation, provided
the emissions stem from activities belonging to "the same industrial group-
ing[,] under control of the same" entity, and "located on one or more contigu-
ous or adjacent properties."'11 The fate of that new interpretation remains
uncertain, however, since at least one circuit has rejected it as inconsistent with
the plain language of the preexisting regulations." 2
Courts in some states with active gas production have also read the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act narrowly to exempt permitted oil and gas operations from
criminal liability for the death of migratory birds that land on wastewater ponds
near gas wells. Recently, for example, the U.S. District Court for North Dakota
held that "as a matter of law," the Act's criminal provisions do not extend to
"lawful commercial activity which may indirectly cause the death of migratory
birds." 113 The North Dakota decision contributes to an as-yet unresolved circuit
split on the reach of the Act. 114
Meanwhile, on the state level, a recent study of shale gas regulations in the
twenty-seven states with active gas production" 5 found that while a few, such
as West Virginia, have relatively comprehensive regulations, most regulate a
much smaller subset of the relevant gas production issues.1 6 In addition, those
state regulations that are in place have a variety of gaps. For example, while
some fifteen states require that companies disclose the chemical ingredients in
the fluid they inject, most such requirements make broad exemptions for trade
secrets." 7 Further, the study notes that states differ significantly in both their
manner of regulating (command-and-control versus performance standards ver-
sus permitting) and the stringency of their enforcement measures.' Finally, the
authors complain of a lack of transparency: state requirements are hard to find
and even harder to understand, particularly when they are not set out in gener-
ally applicable regulations, but incorporated in individual well permits.' '
I Memorandum from Gina McCarthy, Assistant Adm'r, to Reg'l Adm'rs, Regions I-X, on With-
drawal of Source Determinations for Oil and Gas Industries (Sept. 22, 2009).
' Summit Petrol. Corp. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 2012).
"1 United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1213 (D.N.D. 2012).
"4 See United States v. Citgo Petrol. Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 843-47 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(describing, and contributing to the split, and holding that "unprotected oil field equipment can
take or kill migratory birds," giving rise to liability under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (citation
omitted)).
15 The states in this category are: California, Utah, Montana, Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Illinois,
Indiana, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and New York. NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, THE STATE OF
STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION 25 (2013), http://perma.cc/VJ2L-F9CV.
,6 See id. at 43 (cataloging state disclosure rules).
"' Id.; see also MArHEW McFEELEY, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, STATE HYDRAULIC FRAC-
TURING DISCLOSURE RULES AND ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARISON 7 (2012), http://perma.cc/FDJ2-
HEZF (noting that eight of the states with existing disclosure requirements allow companies to
withhold information they deem confidential without any justification or oversight, while only one
state "has a clear process for evaluating and approving or denying trade secret exemption
claims").
"'RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 115, at 13-21.
I 9 id. at 2-3, 6.
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Some limited natural gas governance efforts are also underway at the re-
gional level. The Susquehanna River Basin Commission ("SRBC"), for in-
stance, regulates water withdrawals from the Susquehanna River and its
tributaries in three states-New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. While the
SRBC does not regulate wastewater from hydraulic fracturing operations, it
does restrict consumptive use of water for fracturing and imposes withdrawal
moratoria when water levels are low. Further, the SRBC requires natural gas
companies to abide by all other applicable state and federal water quality and
waste management requirements, and helps to enforce those requirements by
informing companies that failure to comply with other applicable laws can re-
sult in the modification, suspension, or revocation of SRBC's approval of a
water-use request.120
The Delaware River Basin Commission ("DRBC") plays an even more
active role in regulating hydraulic fracturing operations. The Commission man-
ages "water quality, withdrawals, droughts, floods, conservation, and permit-
ting" for the Delaware River and its tributaries in four states-Delaware, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York.' In 2010, the DRBC unanimously di-
rected staff to develop draft hydraulic fracturing regulations through notice-
and-comment rulemaking. 2 2 Subsequently, however, the Commission post-
poned indefinitely its November 21, 2011 special meeting to consider the adop-
tion of the regulations.2 3 In a July 10, 2013 statement, DRBC chair Michele
Siekerka stated that the Commission is working to revise the regulations and
updating them with current research, but she did not give a timeline for finaliz-
ing the current draft. 24
Finally, numerous localities have gotten involved in the regulatory game.
As of June 2014, some 423 localities nationwide (over 200 in New York alone)
have attempted to use their zoning authority to ban hydraulic fracturing activi-
ties within their borders. 25 That approach has prompted numerous preemption
lawsuits. New York State's highest court recently held that zoning bans fit com-
fortably within New York localities' authority,'26 but a West Virginia trial court
found that state law preempted the City of Morgantown's ban.' 27 Existing Colo-
120 See generally FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: SRBC's ROLE IN REGULATING NATURAL GAS
DEVELOPMENT, SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN COMM'N (2012), http://perma.cc/8797-J6CT.
121 Delaware River Basin Commission: Battleground for Gas Drilling, STATEIMPACT, http://perma
.cc/A495-J38D.
122 See Natural Gas Drilling Index Page, DELAWARE RIVER BASIN COMM'N, http://perma.cc/
6YLC-9LAR.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., Local Actions Against Fracking, FOOD & WATER WATCH, http://perma.cc/VM2J-
WEQL.
126 See, e.g., Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188, 1191 (N.Y. 2014), reargument denied,
No. 2014-867, 2014 WL 5366261 (N.Y. Oct. 16, 2014) ("[New York] towns may ban oil and gas
production activities, including hydrofracking, within municipal boundaries through the adoption
of local zoning laws ... because the supersession clause in the statewide Oil, Gas and Solution
Mining Law (OGSML) does not preempt the home rule authority vested in municipalities to regu-
late land use.").
27 See Ne. Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. 1 -C-411, 2011 WL 3584376 (W.
Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011).
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rado precedent points to a similar preemption outcome for pending lawsuits in
that state. 28
In sum, federal, state, regional, and local government entities are begin-
ning to understand and address the variety of public health and environmental
risks associated with the natural gas boom, but as yet there is nothing approach-
ing a comprehensive public regulatory regime. The resulting gaps in govern-
ance have left ample room for private entities to take on such traditionally
governmental tasks as promoting research, gathering and disseminating data,
developing best practices, and assessing and certifying compliance with those
practices.
B. The Scope of Private Governance
Numerous private entities are already undertaking these governance tasks,
including national and regional environmental and public health groups,1 29 the
collaborative or industry-led entities introduced in Part I, and various universi-
ties. 130 In addition, there are also ongoing shareholder efforts to push particular
publicly held companies to minimize "negative impacts from their hydraulic
fracturing operations."'' 31
These players' activities fall into three basic categories: (1) information
gathering and dissemination-collecting and publicizing information about the
risks of unconventional gas drilling; (2) standards setting-developing and pro-
moting a set of best practices to avoid identified risks of gas production; and (3)
standards dissemination and implementation-encouraging and policing adop-
tion of identified best practices. The remainder of the discussion in Part II illus-
trates these categories by reference to the work of the six entities introduced in
Part I: API, ASTM International, CSSD, FracFocus, GAPP, and STRONGER.
128 See generally Grace Hood, Historic Greeley Ruling Looms Large Over Colorado Fracking
Challenges, NPR (Feb. 24, 2014), http:l/perma.cc/YK43-URJR (discussing the historic case of
Voss v. Lundvall Brothers, 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992) (holding that Colorado's Oil and Gas
Conservation Act preempted the home-rule City of Greeley from enacting a land-use ordinance
that banned drilling for oil, gas, or hydrocarbons within the City)).
1
29 See, e.g., MARK ZOBACK, SAYA KITASEI & BRAD COPITHORNE, WORLDWATCH INST., ADDRESS-
ING THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS FROM SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 1 (2010), http://perma.cc/
L9XK-7N56; Natural Gas: Five Areas of Concern, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, http://perma.cc/NA5S-
85TK.
'
30 The University of Colorado Law School's Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources,
Energy, and the Environment, for example, created the Intermountain Oil and Gas BMP Project,
which offers a free-access, searchable database of Best Management Practices ("BMPs") for oil
and gas development in the Intermountain West. Intermountain Oil & Gas BMP Project,
GETCHES-WILKINSON CTR. FOR NATURAL RES., ENERGY, & THE ENV'T, http://perma.cc/B7PN-
352G.
131 Avery Fellow, Investors Demand Climate-Risk Disclosure in 2013 Proxies, BLOOMBERG (Feb.
25, 2013), http://perma.cc/6VQH-WYW2. See also Resolutions: Shareholder Resolutions, INVES-
TOR ENvTL. HEALTH NETWORK, http://perma.cc/FTR9-7XM6 (searching with subject filter "hy-
draulic fracturing").
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1. Information Gathering and Dissemination
FracFocus: Of the six entities identified above, only one, FracFocus, aims
solely at information gathering and dissemination. FracFocus describes itself as
a "national hydraulic fracturing chemical registry.' 3 2 Developed as a "joint
project"'33 between two national quasi-governmental entities, the Ground Water
Protection Council' 34 and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, 3 5
FracFocus aims to be a clearinghouse for information about the chemicals used
in particular gas wells. Well operators are encouraged to self-report their drill-
ing activity and chemical use, and members of the public can then view a map
of the United States, find wells located in a particular geographic area, and
reference a list of the chemicals used at those wells. As of November 2014,
FracFocus identified 1,039 "participating companies"' 13 6 that had submitted
data on over 85,000 wells. 137
Of particular note, although FracFocus is a private enterprise, public legal
regimes are increasingly identifying the registry, by name, as a platform for
complying with public disclosure mandates. Of the eighteen states that have
mandated that hydraulic fracturing companies disclose their chemical use,
eleven now identify FracFocus as their chosen disclosure registry. 3 s Further,
BLM's proposed rules identify FracFocus as a database that drillers on public
lands may use to make required disclosures about various well characteristics,
including location, depth, water use, and chemical use. 139
' About Us, FRACFOcuS, http://perma.cc/QN6Q-4VKJ.
"' FracFocus is Live, FRAcFOcuS, http://perma.cc/QTL8-7DYS. For a discussion of the controver-
sial origins of FracFocus, see generally Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Adminis-
trative Process, 100 VA. L. REv. 953, 1007-14 (2014).
"About Us, GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, http://perma.cc/E3SK-LB52.
3 About Us, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM'N, http://perma.cc/37SG-Z2UB.
'36 Participating Companies List, FRACFOcUs, http://perma.cc/4W68-W3XD.
137 FracFocus 2.0, FRACFocUs, http://perma.cc/UE6X-LREE (showing "total well sites regis-
tered" as 85,659 as of November 15, 2014).
131 Mark Drajem, FracFocus Drillers' Registry to Create Chemicals Database, BLOOMBERG (May
23, 2013), http://perma.cc/6QMW-8E9S. See also Wiseman, supra note 25, at 53-54 (cataloging
state disclosure rules). For an example of a statute mandating the use of FracFocus, see 16 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.29(a)(8), (c)(2)(A) (2014) (defining the state's "Chemical Disclosure Regis-
try" to be FracFocus, and then requiring that on or before a well completion report is submitted to
the state commission, the operator of the well "must complete the Chemical Disclosure Registry
Form and upload the form on the Chemical Disclosure Registry, including" information such as
the total volume of water or other fluid used in the hydraulic fracturing of the well, and all "chem-
ical ingredients used in the hydraulic fracturing treatment(s) of the well").
"' Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on Federal and Indian Lands,
77 Fed. Reg. 27,691, 27,693-94 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160)
("For instance, the BLM is working closely with the Ground Water Protection Council and the
Interstate Oil and Gas Commission in an effort to integrate the disclosure called for in this rule
with the existing Web site known as FracFocus.").
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2. Standards Development: An Introduction to the Players
Other private governance entities are working to develop standards for
natural gas production or standards for regulation of gas production-that is, a
set of best practices for minimizing risks during drilling and extraction.
American Petroleum Institute: One of the most prominent standards-set-
ting entities is the American Petroleum Institute, a trade association represent-
ing "all aspects of America's oil and natural gas industry."'' 40 API explains that
its industry standards represent the "consensus" of experts and "go through a
rigorous review process"' 41 that incorporates familiar elements of administra-
tive procedure, including notice and consideration of outside input. Indeed, the
American National Standards Institute ("ANSI"), a private, nonprofit member-
ship organization that (among other things) certifies that other private entities'
procedures meet certain benchmarks for "openness, balance, consensus and
due process," has approved API's standards development process.142 API's stan-
dards have considerable influence in the public sphere: "approximately 25%, or
125 of API's 550 standards, are referenced in the U.S. Code of Federal Regula-
tions,' ' 43 and state oil and gas regulations and regulatory proposals also incor-
porate API standards. 144
API has developed guidelines that "specifically address the risk manage-
ment issues that accompany [the] construction and management" of shale gas
wells, 4 but it is not clear whether those guidelines conform to the ANSI's
definition of "standards," nor whether API followed its ANSI-approved pro-
cess in developing them. The guidelines are very specific and cover topics in-
cluding (1) well construction and integrity, 46 (2) water use and wastewater
14About API, AM. PETROL. INST., http://perma.cc/V8XU-VH25.
141 API, OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE, supra note 9.
142 Domestic Programs (American National Standards) Overview, AM. NAT'L STANDARDS INST.,
http://perma.cc/GZK8-E4R2. Specifically, ANSI indicates that it reviews organizations' standards-
development procedures to ensure, at a minimum, that those procedures allow for: "consensus on
a proposed standard by a group or 'consensus body' that includes representatives from materially
affected and interested parties;" "broad-based public review and comment on draft standards;"
"consideration of and response to comments submitted by voting members of the relevant consen-
sus body and by public review commenters;" "incorporation of approved changes into a draft
standard;" and "right to appeal by any participant that believes that due process principles were
not sufficiently respected during the standards development in accordance with the ANSI-accred-
ited procedures of the standards developer." Id.
143 AM. PETROL. INST., AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE STANDARDS 8 (2004), http://perma.cc/
B8P6-SS4R.
144 In Pennsylvania, for example, surface casing cement must be "cement that meets or exceeds
the ASTM International C 150, Type I, II or III Standard or API Specification 10." 25 PA. CODE
§ 78.85(a) (2014). West Virginia requires that "[c]ement used to fill the annular space around the
casing .. .be American Petroleum Institute Class A Ordinary Portland cement with no greater
than three percent (3%) calcium chloride and no other additives." W. VA. CODE R. § 35-4-11.5
(2014).145 API, OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE, supra note 9.
146 AM. PETROL. INST., GUIDANCE DocuMENT HFl: HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OPERATIONS-WELL
CONSTRUCTION AND INTEGRITY GUIDELINES (2009) [hereinafter API, HFl], http://perma.cc/
KS8H-UQSS.
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management,'47 and (3) surface impacts. 14 Some of the guidelines appear neu-
tral, technical, and objective. (For example, one guideline indicates "hydraulic
fracturing equipment... must be monitored for leaks and loss of integrity,"' 49
while another refers the reader to a preexisting API standard, RP90, to learn
about maintaining a safe pressure at the wellhead. 150) Conversely, other API
shale gas guidelines reflect not broad consensus but instead the industry's polit-
ical position on controversial policy issues: for example, one policy states,
"[h]ydraulic fracturing should not be regulated under the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA) or any other federal statute. Since hydraulic fracturing has been
successfully managed at the state level, it would be problematic, unnecessary
and duplicative to have any additional requirements at the federal level."'' An
overview of API's relevant guidelines and standards is available in the
Appendix.
American Society of Testing and Materials International: Founded in 1898
as the American Society for Testing and Materials, ASTM International is a
voluntary, private standards-development entity.'52 ASTM has long been a
player in the environmental arena, and as with FracFocus, its work has migrated
into public environmental law. To take just one related example, EPA regula-
tions implementing the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act, allow owners of contaminated land to rely on ASTM
due diligence standards to demonstrate eligibility for the so-called "innocent
landowner defense."' 53
At present, ASTM International's natural gas standards are very much a
work in progress. In 2012, the organization designated a committee, Subcom-
mittee D18.26 on Hydraulic Fracturing, to draft consensus technical standards
for natural gas production. 5 4 ASTM anticipates that its standards will address a
range of issues, including background site investigation, groundwater monitor-
ing and remediation, and permanent well abandonment.'55 The actual drafting
process began in July 2013.156 A list of the topics that ASTM intends to include
in its draft standards is available in the Appendix.
" AM. PETROL. INST., GUIDANCE DOCUMENT HF2: WATER MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH Hy-
DRAULIC FRACTURING (2010), http://perma.cc/W3XJ-TVJA.
'
4 8 AM. PETROL. INST., GUIDANCE DOCUMENT HF3: PRACTICES FOR MITIGATING SURFACE Im-
PACTS ASSOCIATED WITH HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (2011) [hereinafter API, HF3], http://perma
.cc/Y3MW-K3CS.
' Id. at 9.
"'
5 See API, HF1, supra note 146, at 22.
... API, HF3, supra note 148, at 8.
152 See Overview, ASTM INT'L, http://perma.cc/E3PR-BB46.
"' See 40 C.F.R. § 312.11 (2014). ASTM standards have also made their way into some state
hydraulic fracturing laws. See, e.g., supra note 144.
154 Doug Clauson, Hydraulic Fracturing: New ASTM International Subcommittee to Develop
Needed Standards, ASTM STANDARDIZATION NEWS (Nov./Dec. 2012), http://perma.cc/LL7G-
Y8CK.
155 Id.
56ee ASTM WK 42803 New Guide for Data Management and Reporting Associated with Oil
and Gas Development Including Hydraulic Fracturing, ASTM INT'L, http://perma.cc/V6XM-
EK4W.
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Center for Sustainable Shale Development: The recently formed Center
for Sustainable Shale Development offers a different model of private standards
development. A "collaboration... among environmental organizations, philan-
thropic foundations and energy companies from across the Appalachian Ba-
sin," CSSD aims to "develop[] rigorous performance standards for
sustainable shale development" in that Basin, and to use an iterative review
process to revisit and improve those standards as new information and technol-
ogies become available. The board of directors is quite inclusive, comprising
representatives from three environmental groups, four natural gas production
companies, a university, and a foundation, as well as several former govern-
ment officials.'57
CSSD's standards-development process is considerably further along than
ASTM International's effort. As of October 2013, CSSD had identified fifteen
"initial" standards, each with subparts, aimed at protecting "air quality, water
resources and climate."' 58 The group pledged, however, that it would learn
from the implementation of these fifteen standards and "adopt[ I further inno-
vations" and "revise [the] standards as appropriate."' 15 9 The fifteen initial stan-
dards are available in the Appendix.
Gas and Preservation Partnership: A fourth private entity seeking to iden-
tify best practices for unconventional gas extraction is the fledgling Gas and
Preservation Partnership. 60 Like CSSD, GAPP seeks to bring together diverse
stakeholders from nongovernmental organizations, universities, and industry.
But GAPP seeks to address a different set of risks than CSSD-the risks to
historic and cultural preservation (that is, the risks posed by drilling on or near
Civil War battlefield sites, historic cemeteries, or Native American settlements,
burial sites, or mounds). 16 1 GAPP's website explains that it intends to "work
collaboratively and pragmatically with both the energy industry and the preser-
vation community to identify and properly manage historic and cultural re-
sources while encouraging efficient exploration and development of energy
reserves."' 162 Specifically, the group aims to "devise, exchange, and verify im-
plementation of model voluntary practices for the shale gas industry."' 163 As of
October 2014, however, GAPP had not yet issued draft practices.
State Review of Oil and Natural Gas Environmental Regulations: The fifth
and final standards-development entity is the State Review of Oil and Natural
Gas Environmental Regulations. Created by the public Interstate Oil and Gas
Compact Commission with funding from EPA, the Department of Energy, and
API, 164 STRONGER is a nonprofit collaborative with a diverse board that com-
157 CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., http://perma.cc/RJ6T-LB6S.
... Performance Standards, CTR. FOR SUSTAINAABLE SHALE DEV., http://perma.cc/WXM9-52F8.
159 Id.
160 GAS & PRES. P'SHiP, http://perma.cc/X2LA-KXZM.
161 Id.
162 GAPP's Mission, GAS & PRES. P'SHIP, http://perma.cc/TM9R-6FBD.
163/d.
"6 See About Us: Who We Are, STATE REVIEW OF OnL & NATURAL GAS ENvrL. REGULATIONS,
http://perma.ccIT6ZQ-K6E7 (describing the group's funding).
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prises representatives from environmental NGOs, the oil and gas industry, and
state regulatory agencies. 165
Unlike the other standards-development entities, STRONGER does not
(primarily) aim to develop freestanding gas production standards, but instead to
identify and then use gas production guidelines as a "yardstick by which to
evaluate state [regulatory] programs, identify program strengths, and make
recommendations for improvement."' 166 STRONGER stakeholder "review
teams" compare state oil and gas regulatory programs to STRONGER's guide-
lines, prepare a state "report card," and suggest regulatory improvements. 67
That said, the first step in STRONGER's effort is, of necessity, the same as
that for API and the other private standards organizations: the development of
appropriate guidelines. STRONGER's development process involves multi-
stakeholder review and consensus adoption. 168 Developed in 2010 by a "hy-
draulic fracturing workgroup" (the composition of which is not disclosed on
the group's website), 69 STRONGER's guidelines for hydraulic fracturing sug-
gest that state regulatory programs should cover risks ranging from well integ-
rity, to groundwater monitoring and spill control, to public disclosure of the
constituents of fracturing fluid. 70 The complete guidelines are available in the
Appendix.
3. Standards Development: A Comparison of Ongoing Efforts
The five standards-development entities' guidelines or best practices for
hydraulic fracturing do not readily lend themselves to comparison because they
are in various states of completion, use different terminology, and in some
cases refer to entirely separate and previously published standards. That said,
some broad observations are possible:
1. With the exception of GAPP's planned guidelines, which will focus on a
different set of concerns, all of the identified guidelines or draft guidelines
take a broad view of hydraulic fracturing risks that extends well beyond the
"frac job" itself to encompass many of the pollution and safety risks iden-
tified in Part I.B above. 17'
165 See Our Team: Voting Members, STATE REVIEW OF OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGULA-
TIONS, http://perma.cc/ENE7-J999.
'66 Memorandum from the STRONGER Board to Persons Interested in the Hydraulic Fracturing
Guidelines (Feb. 8, 2010), http://perma.cc/H8XY-CN5F.
167 See State Reviews: The Process, STATE REVIEW OF OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGULA-
TIONS, http://perma.cc/Y8KT-YSMN.
168 See STATE REVIEW OF OnL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGULATIONS, 2013 STRONGER GUIDE-
LINES § 1.1 (2013), http://perma.cc/H9YD-LYA8.
169 The only reference to this "workgroup" appears in the guidelines themselves. See id.
70 See id. § 9.
171 See infra Appendix.
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2. All of the groups strive to provide assurances that the guidelines or draft
guidelines were or will be drafted with attention to process concerns, such
as independence, transparency, and diversity of representation.'
3. On the other hand, none of the organizations offers an easy way to assess
whether those process concerns have in fact been addressed. CSSD, for
instance, indicates that its staff is "not associated with industry";'73 that its
funding sources are "diverse, coming from fees for evaluation services,
philanthropy, and donations"; 17 4 that its board, which must approve all
standards, comprises an equal number of "representatives of environmental
organizations, industry, and the government, academic or other unaligned
sectors";'75 and that, over time, its standards will be amended "[w]ith in-
put from operators, regulators, CSSD auditors, environmental groups and
other stakeholders ... to ensure the [standards] continue to drive leading
practices."'76 But CSSD does not provide outsiders the means to assess
whether the standards development and amendment processes are in fact
open or participatory, or the means to gauge how its staff plans to handle
the inevitable disputes among those diverse stakeholders.
4. The fourth observation relates to a stark difference among the guidelines:
they vary widely in their comprehensibility-an important characteristic if
one is assessing the degree to which stakeholders outside of industry can
meaningfully participate in development and amendment.
On one end of the spectrum, CSSD's guidelines are clear and concise,
and they are phrased in aspirational terms and do not refer to particular
technologies, so they can be readily understood by a reader with no techni-
cal background. For example, Standard 7.1 provides, "[o]perators shall
design and install casing and cement to completely isolate the well and all
drilling and produced fluids from surface waters and aquifers."' 77
By contrast, many of API's guidelines are dense, technical, and
largely incomprehensible to anyone outside the industry. For example, API
HF1 Guideline 5.4 provides, "[a]ppropriate cement testing procedures
should be properly carried out by the service company personnel (see API
RP 1OB-2). Cement slurry design should include testing to measure . . .
slurry density;... thickening time; fluid loss control; free fluid; compress-
ive strength development; fluid compatibility (cement, mix fluid, mud,
spacer)." 78
172 See id.
171 CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., CSSD GOVERNANCE § MA, http://perma.cc/E8TG-
LK6A.
174 Id.
175 Id. § lI.B.
176 Performance Standards, supra note 158.
171 CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 4 (2013), http://perma.cc/
3YXV-NKUQ.
7'8 API, HFI, supra note 146, at 7-8.
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The contrast between these examples is clear, though its import is less
so: on the one hand, CSSD's phraseology can be readily understood by a
reader with no technical background; on the other hand, API's guidelines
are much more comprehensive. Which approach is preferable likely de-
pends on whether one assumes that industry is well meaning but needs
detailed guidance (in which case one might prefer API's approach), or
whether one instead assumes outside involvement is necessary to ensure
that standards are rigorous and meaningful (in which case one would likely
prefer CSSD's approach).
5. Relatedly, the guidelines differ in the degree to which they use perform-
ance standards versus directives to guide industry practice.
Many of CSSD's guidelines are phrased as performance standards. For
example, Standard 1.1 provides that "[o]perators shall maintain zero dis-
charge of wastewater (including drilling, flowback and produced waters) to
Waters of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and other states."'79
Other entities' guidelines take a more prescriptive approach. For ex-
ample, API HF1 Guideline 7.3 suggests that, at a minimum, the surface
drill pipe, or casing, is cemented in place at least 100 feet below the deep-
est underground drinking water source to minimize the potential for
contamination. 180
6. Finally, the groups' overall goals differ. CSSD aims to develop standards
that "drive leading industry practices" and that "require[ ] a level of envi-
ronmental performance that exceeds the regulatory minimums established
by the states and the federal government."' I API's goals are similar but
slightly more modest: the group's best practices should "meet or exceed
federal requirements while remaining flexible enough to accommodate the
variations in state regulatory frameworks that often occur due to funda-
mental differences in regional geology and other factors."' 82 STRONGER,
by contrast, aims for outcomes: protecting "public health, safety, and the
environment," and specifically in the natural gas context, "prevent[ing]
the contamination of groundwater and surface water from hydraulic
fracturing." '183
Part III revisits these similarities and differences in discussing the roles
that private governance entities may play in the development of a comprehen-
sive gas governance regime.
179 CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE Dev., supra note 177, at 1.
'oAPI, HF1, supra note 146, at 11.
'8 Performance Standards, supra note 158.
182 AM. PETROL. INST., OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY GUIDANCE/BEST PRACTICES ON HYDRAULIC FRAC-
TURING (HF) (2012), http://perma.cc/LM5N-XS39.
183 STATE REVIEW OF OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGULATIONS, 2014 STRONGER GUIDELINES
§§ 1.1, 9.2 (2014), http://perma.cc/TL2J-7EVV.
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4. Standards Implementation and Enforcement
Finally, private entities are also actively engaged in developing strategies
for dissemination, implementation, and enforcement of identified best prac-
tices. As noted above, STRONGER is the only group whose principal aim is
not merely to identify standards but to encourage their public adoption. States
that have volunteered for STRONGER review submit their environmental regu-
latory programs to the organization, and its "stakeholder" teams evaluate and
score the states' programs. 18 4 STRONGER's principal innovation, then, is its
decision to focus less on the criteria themselves and more on their implementa-
tion, through a deliberate and targeted effort to evaluate states' regulatory re-
gimes and push reform where those regimes are inadequate to achieve the
identified goals. Thus far, STRONGER indicates it has conducted six state re-
views focused on hydraulic fracturing regulatory regimes. 8 '
In addition to STRONGER, groups like FracFocus and CSSD, which are
aimed principally at information disclosure and standards development, respec-
tively, must also confront questions about standards dissemination, adoption,
and verification. At this point, the standards are all so new that no statistics are
available as to how many gas production operators have adopted any particular
set of standards. As for questions of verification, the simplest option for a stan-
dards organization is to encourage voluntary adoption and permit self-reporting
of compliance. As might be expected, however, research on voluntary environ-
mental standards programs outside the natural gas context suggests that pro-
grams that require independent verification of compliance are more likely to
improve participants' environmental performance than those that allow self-
reporting. 86
FracFocus and CSSD offer ready examples of these two alternative ap-
proaches. FracFocus provides an information disclosure platform but does not
appear to conduct any in-house or third-party assessment of the completeness
and accuracy of particular companies' disclosures (though of course individual
states that use FracFocus as a disclosure platform can choose to add assessment
procedures to their basic disclosure requirements). At the opposite end of the
spectrum, CSSD is working to develop "an independent, third-party process to
certify companies that achieve and maintain" the Center's standards. 187
With that background, Part III situates these six entities' governance ef-
forts in the broader context of private environmental governance theory.
III. PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE THEORY
Until recently, much of the discussion around private entities engaged in
activities that could be dubbed "environmental governance" concerned the ef-
184 Id. § 1.1.185 See STATE REVIEW OF OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGULATIONS, supra note 168, § 1.1.
186 See generally Damall & Sides, supra note 18.
187 CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., supra note 157.
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ficacy of private systems of industry self-regulation.' Over the last decades,
though, scholars exploring more flexible and adaptive forms of "new govern-
ance"'189 have begun to recognize and explore the important ways that private
organizations' efforts to develop and market innovative policy approaches can
catalyze and advance-or, at times, stymie-the development of public or hy-
brid governance regimes. 90 In brief, "[p]rivate governance could fill gaps
where public governance cannot reach because of political, territorial, or exper-
tise gaps. It also could undermine, enhance, delay, accelerate, or complement
government action in situations where government can act."'1
9
'
A. The Hurdles Facing Public Environmental Governance
This relatively new exploration of the synergies between private and pub-
lic environmental governance has its roots in several other areas of scholarship,
188 See, e.g., AL IANNUZZI, JR., INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE (2002) (providing case studies of and benchmarking various industry self-regulatory
programs, including the chemical industry's Responsible Care program and the EPA's now-defunct
Project XL); Steinzor, supra, note 23 at 122-50 (providing a detailed case study and critique of
Project XL).
"' For a few of the many possible definitions of this term and collections of further references,
see, for example, Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blur-
ring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 591, 592-93, 594 n.7
(2010) (noting that "much of the literature ... uses the term . . . to refer to a specific kind of
regulatory approach, generally one with particular attributes such as benchmarking, transparency
and democratic participation," but that the article uses the term "to describe a regulatory strategy
or tool-or ... as an 'attitude' "); Bradley C. Karkkainen, "New Governance" in Legal Thought
and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474,
474-76 nn. 13-25 (2004) ("[T]he New Governance model . . . breaks with fixity, state-centrism,
hierarchy, excessive reliance on bureaucratic expertise, and intrusive prescription. It aspires in-
stead to be more open-textured, participatory, bottom-up, consensus-oriented, contextual, flexible,
integrative, and pragmatic."); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371-404 (2004) ("The new
governance model challenges . . . conventional assumptions. It broadens the decision-making
playing field by involving more actors in the various stages of the legal process. It also diversifies
the types of expertise and experience that these new actors bring to the table. [New] governance
is a regime based on engaging multiple actors and shifting citizens from passive to active roles.
The exercise of normative authority is pluralized.").
190 Some examples of this newer literature include Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 170 (noting that
to date few legal scholars have focused on private environmental governance and developing a
model that "suggests that [while] private environmental governance is not a substitute for public
governance... it can fill temporal or other gaps in the public governance response to environmen-
tal issues," id. at 163); Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry's LEED: Municipal Adoption of
Private Green Buildings Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285, 317-20 (2010) (discussing various mod-
els of local governance of green building design, from purely public to purely private); Heather
Hughes, Enabling Investment in Environmental Sustainability, 85 IND. L.J. 597 (2010) (suggesting
an amendment to Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 to facilitate-and thus incentivize-trans-
actions that enable companies to improve their environmental practices); Meidinger, supra note
19, at 234 (discussing the role of private regulatory systems in ensuring food safety, and noting
that "most private regulatory programs are ... deeply intertwined with governmental and inter-
governmental regulatory structures [and that] many have developed increasingly 'public' dimen-
sions in that they seek to incorporate the concerns of all interested parties, operate with a high
degree of transparency, and implement standards that claim to be in the public interest").
.9 Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 186.
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including the well-developed literature on the limitations of traditional regula-
tory law and of "laboratory federalism."' 192 Though this Article does not at-
tempt to provide a comprehensive overview of those roots, some background is
helpful to contextualize the work of private gas governance entities.
Scholars-and, for that matter, informed citizens-have long understood
that numerous barriers impede the promulgation of socially beneficial laws and
regulations, in the environmental arena as elsewhere. Perhaps most familiar and
accessible is the work of those public choice theorists who have used economic
models to argue that public policy development is not wholly an altruistic en-
terprise, but instead a "competition between private interest groups for legisla-
tive influence." '193 In the administrative law context, the familiar term for the
idea is "agency capture," which conveys that regulators may be unable to resist
the influence of powerful interest groups that either oppose socially beneficial
laws or promote laws that advance their own agenda at the expense of the
public good.
194
The now unremarkable fact that lobbyists and, in turn, government policy-
makers may act in self-interested ways is not, however, the only impediment to
public-spirited environmental governance. Building on the work of prior schol-
ars, Tracey Roberts discusses five stages of public govemance-(1) agenda-
setting, (2) negotiation of standards, (3) implementation, (4) monitoring, and
(5) enforcement-and identifies dysfunctions that can occur at each stage.'95
She notes, for instance, that at the agenda-setting stage, barriers or imbalances
in access to information (so-called "information failures") can stymie public
entities' efforts even to identify, let alone decide, how to address the external-
ized social costs of particular industry activities.196 This problem is particularly
acute in the environmental context because natural systems are enormously
complex and nonlinear.' As a result, causal pathways can be difficult to dis-
192 See generally, e.g., Michael S. Sparer & Lawrence D. Brown, States and the Health Care
Crisis: The Limits and Lessons of Laboratory Federalism, in HEALTH4 POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND
THE AMERICAN STATES 181 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996).
191 Aziz Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REv. 1435, 1502 & nn.272-77
(introducing public choice theory and collecting references).
'94 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1039, 1050-52 (1997) (explaining capture theory); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1684-87 (1975) (discussing various rea-
sons, other than overt "capture," why one might generally expect agencies to take a pro-industry
stance).
1 Roberts, supra note 15, at 77-78 (citing Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Govern-
ance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the Law, in THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL REGULATION 43 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009)).
196 Id. at 78.
1 Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court, 47 UCLA L. REv. 703, 744-47 (2000) ("The primary source of this uncertainty is the sheer
complexity of the natural environment and, accordingly, how much is still unknown about it. This
uncertainty expresses itself in our inability to know beforehand the environmental impact of cer-
tain actions. It equally undermines our ability to apprehend, after the fact, what precisely caused
certain environmental impacts.").
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cern-a problem that is compounded by the long latency period between many
toxic exposures and resulting public health harms. 98
At each subsequent stage of public environmental governance, additional
hurdles arise. For one thing, lawmakers receive only a fraction of the benefits
of the laws they enact, so they "have weak incentives to produce . . . legal
innovations."'' 99 There are also the checks and balances deliberately introduced
into our legislative (and regulatory) processes to slow the growth of govern-
ment,2°° as well as "the limits of jurisdictional boundaries," 0' 1 ideological
"preference[s] for small government, ' 20 and the challenges of funding and
enforcing socially beneficial regulations.0 3
Shifting the focus away from any particular public governance effort to
the functioning of our broader federal system exposes still other dysfunctions.
Consider laboratory federalism-the idea, long heralded by courts, that one of
the central advantages of our federal system is states' ability to function as
policy "laborator[ies], ' '204 testing legislative and regulatory responses to new
and imperfectly understood social problems "without dragging the whole coun-
try into the experiment. ' 205 "[Sleveral crucial and successful national efforts
originated in this way, including women's suffrage, unemployment insurance,
. . . minimum wage laws,"206 and now the move toward marriage equality.207
Indeed, there is a recent example in the environmental arena-California has
been recognized as a "laboratory for the demonstration of cutting edge" tech-
nologies and policies to control greenhouse gas emissions. 28
Yet there are, again, myriad barriers that may prevent the ideal of labora-
tory federalism from being realized on the ground. For one thing, because de-
198 Id.
199 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 21, at 522.
200 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin's Originalism,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 663, 681-82 (2009) ("The Framers themselves made it quite clear that they
designed the Madisonian system of checks and balances to prevent temporary passions, which
might engulf the body politic, from being legislated immediately into law. They guaranteed...
that change would be slow and incremental ... .
2I Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 164.
202 Id.
203 Roberts, supra note 15, at 68-69.
2 4 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.").
205 David Snyder, Molecular Federalism and the Structures of Private Lawmaking, 14 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 419, 431 (2007); cf Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV.
317, 398 (1997) (noting that the term "laboratories" may misleadingly suggest sterile or con-
trolled trials, while "state experimentation is ... creative response to immediate necessity").
206 Snyder, supra note 205, at 431.
207 See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Federalism Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 435, 454 (2013) ("[The Court
in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013)] may have been vindicating federalism
concerns more broadly by leaving the merits of marriage equality to the states for a while longer.
Thus federalism interests do not tug only in the direction of protecting California's initiative sys-
tem: the states more generally also may have an interest in working through issues of social policy
as our fifty laboratories of democracy.").
2 0 JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34099, CALIFORNIA'S WAIVER REQUEST
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES FROM MOTOR VEHICLES 2 (2009).
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velopment of socially beneficial law is a classically under-produced public
good, states "do not conduct experiments at the levels thought ideal by policy-
makers." 2°9 Risk- and cost-averse state regulators do not see adequate benefit in
going first; they would prefer to wait and let other states take the regulatory
lead. There is also the risk that states will engage in a "race to the bottom,"
competing not to have the most protective policies, but instead to attract indus-
try with the most lenient and business-friendly regulatory regimes. 10
Further, even when state experimentation occurs, there are impediments to
the diffusion of successful policies, either horizontally (between states) or verti-
cally (between a state and the federal government). The political impediments
are straightforward-a policy that has been quite successful in, say, California
may well be politically unpalatable in a central red state for that reason alone
(and vice versa). But there are practical hurdles, too. Even when one state is
innovating, it has neither an easy mechanism nor a strong incentive to share
data about its policy successes and failures with other jurisdictions." I A state's
job is to govern, not to develop and market successful governance strategies for
other states to adopt.
B. The Hurdles in Context: Public Governance of Natural Gas Risks
Illustrations of the hurdles impeding public environmental governance
abound in the natural gas world. Information failures, for example, plague ef-
forts to hold drilling companies responsible for water contamination near drill-
ing sites. Populations that live in close proximity to new gas wells regularly
209 Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-
Fashioned Federalists' Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749, 1764 (2013) (citing Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
593, 594, 610-11 (1980); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925-26 (1994); David A. Super, Laboratories of Desti-
tution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541
(2008)).
21 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977) ("Given
the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may rationally decline
unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry and
obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be more
than offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower standards."). But see generally
Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom"
Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that
competition among states will produce an efficient allocation of industrial activity).
2'1 See generally Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
("Sub-federal actors with regulatory or regulatory-type responsibilities, including stakeholder
groups, municipalities, and states ...often lack basic, comprehensive information about what
other [such entities] are trying policy-wise, and it takes legal and policy experts years to collect
and synthesize this information."); Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy?
Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1351 (2009) (noting that
"good information" about other jurisdictions' innovations "may often prove elusive [because]
innovators rarely have incentives to generate their own information, other actors may have limited
knowledge about the most useful aspects of an experiment, and innovating jurisdictions may actu-
ally actively conceal information about their activities from outsiders").
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complain of flammable water that tastes strange and causes headaches. 212 But
little is known about the baseline quality of water in the area of many natural
gas wells. 213 Moreover, even drillers themselves are unable to predict with cer-
tainty where rock fractures will arise, and along what paths. As a result, indus-
try has largely been free to dismiss claims of contamination2 14 while
simultaneously preserving the information imbalance by declining to release
information about what kinds of chemicals are in their proprietary "slickwater"
mixtures.215
The resulting uncertainty around water contamination from natural gas
wells has stymied public action to address the threat of contamination, for at
least two reasons. First, even well-meaning public agencies have been hard
pressed to figure out whether the contamination risks are real and, if so, which
aspects of the drilling process require regulation and what forms that regulation
should take. The ideal regulatory approach would be very different, for exam-
ple, if one were convinced that water pollution stemmed from the fracturing of
rock layers deep underground than if one instead believed the problem
stemmed from inadequately lined wastewater ponds. Second, the difficulty in
identifying and quantifying the risk to water sources and other public resources
has made it challenging for public health and environmental advocates to
counter industry assertions that the real social costs of hydraulic fracturing
come not from drilling but from regulation of drilling, which limits job creation
and thwarts economic development. 216
Both legislative and regulatory capture are also evident in the natural gas
world. The history of SDWA's sweeping exemption for the underground injec-
tion of fluids during hydraulic fracturing operations,2 17 for example, strongly
hints of undue industry influence. As Hannah Wiseman documents, EPA first
studied the need for SDWA regulation of hydraulic fracturing in 2004, reaching
a conclusion starkly different 2I from the Agency's current pro-regulatory
stance219 on the issue. Specifically, the Agency's 2004 report concluded that the
risks of injecting "fracturing fluids into [certain] wells poses little or no threat
to [underground sources of drinking water] and does not justify additional
study at this time. '20 While EPA heard from a wide range of stakeholders prior
to reaching this conclusion, there is evidence to suggest that industry-friendly
212 See, e.g., GASLAND: THE MOVIE (New Video Group 2010).
213 See, e.g., Kate Galbraith, Strong Rules on Fracking in Wyoming Seen as Model, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 22, 2013), http://perma.cc/5Y3X-BFVU.
214 See, e.g., Steve Everley, How Anti-Fracking Activists Deny Science: Water Contamination,
ENERGY IN DEPTH (Aug. 13, 2013), http://perma.cc/X4MK-9BPS.
25 See How to Read a Fracturing Record, FRACFOcus, http://perma.cc/Z2FT-D3ZS (noting that
even FracFocus allows companies to redact proprietary ingredients in their fracturing fluid).
216 See, e.g., IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, MEASURING THE ECONOMIC AND ENERGY IMPACTS OF PROPOS-
ALS TO REGULATE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING (2009), http://perma.cc[WZ8U-ELTW.
217 For the text of SDWA, see supra note 90.
211 See Wiseman, supra note 96, at 180-82.
219 See EPA 's Study of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas and Its Potential Impact on Drinking
Water Resources, EPA, http://perma.cc/N4AQ-PGRZ.
220 EPA, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAU-
LIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS ES-1 (2004), http://perma.cc/BW3A-HFTQ.
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interests may well "have had the upper hand" in molding the Agency's final
conclusions.22'
On the legislative side, after EPA published its report, "industry 'vigor-
ously used [the] results to lobby Congress. In October 2003, for example, the
American Exploration and Production Council urged... 'the 108th Congress
[to] move quickly to pass"' the SDWA exemption for hydraulic fracturing.22
Moreover,
The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission, a group of state
regulators, called the legislation its own, stating, "President Bush
signed into law the new energy bill this summer, which includes the
IOGCC's proposal to resolve the hydraulic fracturing issue and brings
several years of hard work by the Commission to fruition. 223
Plainly, "industry had a strong stake in both the outcome of the report and the
legislation, and made its views on the matter clear. '224 And industry has also
played a role in shaping some state disclosure laws that incorporate industry-
friendly loopholes.225
A final example of the impediments facing public gas governance con-
cerns laboratory federalism. The recent report summarizing the state of state
shale gas regulation 226 illustrates that there are practical impediments to realiz-
ing courts' ideal of states as the originators and testers of policy innovations
that eventually spread outwards and upwards, to other states and the federal
government. Although states currently are experimenting with an array of dif-
ferent shale gas regulatory approaches, it is remarkably difficult for outsiders to
discern either (1) the contours of a particular state's standards, or (2) how dili-
gently and effectively the state is implementing and enforcing those stan-
dards. 227 This opacity exists in part because many states incorporate well
performance requirements in individual permits. 28 As a result, even if a state
has developed an innovative approach to well regulation, only the state regula-
tors and the permit holder know of the approach, and there is little or no oppor-
tunity for regulators in other states to learn of it.229
221 Wiseman, supra note 96, at 180-82.
222 Id. at 181 (quoting a report from the American Exploration and Production Council).
223 Id. (quoting IOGCC, Congress Passes IOGCC's Legislative Fix for Hydraulic Fracturing: His-
torical Overview, COMPACT COMMENTS (2005), http://perma.cc/QXQ2-LTX3).
224 Id.
221 Mike McIntire, Conservative Nonprofit Acts as a Stealth Business Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
21, 2012), http://perma.cc/AP57-MU4F ("ALEC adopted model legislation, based on a Texas law,
addressing the public disclosure of chemicals in drilling fluids used to extract natural gas through
hydraulic fracturing .... The ALEC legislation, which has since provided the basis for similar
bills submitted in five states, has been promoted as a victory for consumers' right to know about
potential drinking water contaminants[, but a] close reading of the bill ... reveals loopholes that
would allow energy companies to withhold the names of certain fluid contents .... [T]he bill was
sponsored within ALEC by ExxonMobil, one of the largest practitioners of fracking .....
226 RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 115.
227 Id. at 2-3, 6.
228 Id. at 10 ("[Tlhe case-by-case character of regulation by permitting makes it very difficult to
evaluate regulatory stringency and some other characteristics.").
229 See generally Wiseman, supra note 211 (exploring this problem in a variety of contexts).
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A slightly different problem also stands in the way of successful labora-
tory federalism. Geologic and hydrogeologic conditions vary widely between
states, so one state's successes may not readily translate to another area. More
fundamentally, it may be difficult to assess the "success" of any particular
state's regulatory regime. In Maryland, for example, policymakers are consider-
ing allowing hydraulic fracturing, subject to stringent regulations to mitigate
risks.230 One measure of the on-the-ground impact of Maryland's proposed stan-
dards would be to evaluate whether they discouraged gas extraction activities in
Maryland or, on the other hand, reduced the risks of those activities. Gas indus-
try insiders indicate, however, that there is a very different reason why they
may choose not to exploit Maryland's natural gas resources: Maryland's gas is
"dry," meaning it contains fewer of the more lucrative liquid fractions (like
butane and propane) that have drawn industry to shale plays in other states. As
a result, the incidence of natural gas-related environmental or public health
harms in Maryland may stay quite low for reasons unrelated to the efficacy of
the state's regulatory policies.231
C. Private Environmental Governance: A Partial Solution?
Perhaps unsurprisingly, private governance entities readily surmount some
of the hurdles that stand in the way of public environmental governance, such
as the information and comprehension problems that plague any less technolog-
ically savvy public institution seeking to regulate a complex industry like natu-
ral gas production. On the other hand, numerous hurdles impede private
governance-some that are familiar from the public governance world and
some that are unique to private efforts. This section first explores the positive
ways that private entities can contribute to mitigation of environmental risks
and then turns to some of the hurdles.
To start with the positive, Tracey Roberts has noted that private entities
may have better access to high quality information about the workings of the
industry232-particularly when the industry is as complex and technical as the
oil and gas industry. Private entities' familiarity with the contours of industry
practice, in turn, enables them to develop sophisticated platforms (like
230 See Jonathan Wilson, Covepoint Serves as Flash Point for Maryland Debate over Fracking,
NPR (July 11, 2014), http://perma.cc/L85J-R5UN.
231 See id. (quoting Drew Cobbs from the Maryland Petroleum Council as observing that "in the
end, they probably will recommend going forward with fracking in Maryland, with safeguards.
And from what I've seen and where things stand right now, Maryland will by far have the strictest
and tightest regulations in place if we do go forward with fracking" and characterizing him as
holding the view that "it's not even clear who will want to drill in Maryland . . . [because]
Maryland's deposit is mostly dry gas ... so it's not worth as much [and the state's] regulations
may be so strict that it won't be worth it for companies to drill [there]").
232 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 109-12 (discussing the role of private "disclosure and reporting
initiatives" in addressing information asymmetries).
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FracFocus)233 to gather industry information. Finally, these entities may be bet-
ter situated to understand the incoming information and assess its accuracy.3 4
Private policy-development efforts also need not obey jurisdictional
boundaries nor appeal to any particular political constituency. As a result, these
private efforts "can be segmented, and then infinitely and constantly rearranged
to meet particular and changing needs. Private lawmaking is literally boundless,
in that it is not tied to geographical boundaries. And it is flexible: private law-
making can adapt to different situations in different ways." '235
The work of a group like CSSD provides a helpful illustration of this
point. CSSD aims "to support continuous improvement and innovative prac-
tices through performance standards and third-party certification" for shale de-
velopment efforts in the Appalachian Basin.236 It may well be that natural gas
standards must be tailored to local conditions, as Merrill and Schizer argue,237
but the relevant "locality" is likely to be defined by geological and hydrologi-
cal (and climatic and political) conditions, not state boundaries. Because of this,
federal efforts to address natural gas pollution might fail to account for condi-
tions in Appalachian Basin states, while state regulatory efforts would be
thwarted by the inability to develop a cooperative regime that works equally
well across the whole Basin. CSSD has no such conces-it can develop stan-
dards for its basin of interest without regard to political boundaries and then
focus its political efforts on incentivizing industry to adopt those standards.
Indeed, incentivizing industry adoption of environmental standards plays
to private entities' strengths because privately developed standards may appeal
to industry in a way that public regulation never can. Privately developed envi-
ronmental standards may serve a variety of business-friendly purposes, includ-
ing: (1) pricing smaller, noncompliant competitors out of the market;238 (2)
serving as a baseline for reasonable care in the industry, and thereby protecting
compliant industry players from tort liability;239 (3) improving the industry's
image with consumers;2 40 and (4) reassuring regulators that the industry itself is
233 See supra text accompanying notes 132-39.
234 See Roberts, supra note 15, at 109-11.
235 Snyder, supra note 205, at 433.
236 About the Center For Sustainable Shale Development, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV.,
http://perma.cc/G2Q9-PQLL.
231 See Merrill & Schizer, supra note 32, at 151-52.
238 See David V. Snyder, Contract Regulation, With and Without the State: Ruminations on Rules
and Their Sources. A Comment on Ju'rgen Basedow, 56 AM. J. CoMp. L. 723, 729 (2008) ("By
erecting an elaborate regime to which all serious market players must adhere, a group can cer-
tainly achieve anticompetitive effects .... [S]ome industry players may seek to have their rules
imposed on other industry players-not to raise barriers to entry, but to gain a competitive advan-
tage over a rival that will have to change the way it does business.").
239 See Rachel Saltzman, Establishing a "Due Care" Standard Under the Lacey Act Amendments
of 2008, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 6 (2010) ("In products liability suits, compli-
ance with trade or industry custom often provides meaningful evidence for a party defending
against a negligence claim. Similarly, compliance with procurement standards, rating systems, or
certification programs intended to address illegal logging should provide meaningful evidence of
due care under the Lacey Act.").
240 See, e.g., IANNUZZI, JR., supra note 188, at 26 (noting that some companies adopt self-regula-
tory initiatives "because they are aware of consumers' concerns for the environment"); see also
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addressing all of the important safety concerns and need not be further regu-
lated.24' Again, the facts in the natural gas world speak for themselves on this
point: the same industry players that publicly tout the safety of hydraulic frac-
turing,242 and oppose federal regulation of natural gas drilling,243 are front and
center on the list of supporters of API, ASTM, CSSD, and GAPP's standards-
development efforts. 44
A separate point about private governance relates to private entities' role in
policy dissemination-that is, in the broader diffusion of successful policy
strategies. A state may have neither the resources nor any reason to publicize
how it achieved its policy successes. Indeed, if one accepts the idea that states
use their policy innovations to compete for a highly mobile citizenry,245 then a
successful state regulatory innovation is akin to a newly developed, but not yet
patented technology-the state has every incentive to tout (or perhaps even
exaggerate) its policy success but little reason to explain the details of its pol-
icy. By contrast, private organizations have the ability and the incentive to mar-
ket their successful policy innovations-whether information databases or
standards or regulatory strategies-to industry players, the public, and regula-
tors at all levels of government. The incentive arises because these organiza-
tions are, of necessity, externally rather than internally focused. They exist to
promote their information platforms, environmental standards, or regulatory
strategies to industry players or regulators, either as a direct source of revenue
(if they charge for use of their information platform or sell published standards
guides) 246 or as a selling point for fundraising (if they seek public funding or
Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 167 (explaining that this consumer-driven pressure to "green"
industry practices can be larger than one might expect, because (1) if the greening can be done
efficiently, "the additional cost to the consumer of the substitute good or of not purchasing a good
may be small," and further, (2) even though consumers may not be willing to pay much more for
green goods, "firms also respond to more generalized concerns about firm or brand reputation").
241 Roberts, supra note 15, at 74 (citing David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate
Conduct, in THE PoLrncs OF GLOBAL REGULATION 151, 159, 167-68 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire
Woods eds., 2009)).
242 See, e.g., Reuters, Shell President: Fracking Safe, YouTuBE (July 7, 2011), http://perma.cc/
TW6Z-MTFT8.
243 See id.; see also API, HF3, supra note 148, at 8 ("Hydraulic fracturing should not be regulated
under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) or any other federal statue. Since hydraulic fracturing
has been successfully managed at the state level, it would be problematic, unnecessary and dupli-
cative to have any additional requirements at the federal level.").
244 See supra text accompanying notes 140-70 (discussing the sponsors of these private govern-
ance entities); see also Strategic Partners, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEv., http://perma.cc/
K4EE-W8LF.
245 Daniel Abebe & Aziz Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach, 66 VAND. L.
REv. 723, 765-66 (2013) (noting that "subnational units . .. have an incentive to compete for
populations," and citing Jonathan A. Rodden, Federalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITi-
CAL ECONOMY 357, 360 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006) (defining "compet-
itive federalism" as the idea that "under decentralization, a government must compete for mobile
citizens and firms, who sort themselves into the jurisdiction that best reflects their preferences for
bundles of governmental goods and policies")).
246 ASTM, for example, publishes an Annual Book of ASTM Standards, made up of more than
eighty volumes, that is available for sale at the Society's online bookstore, http://perma.cc/C6FE-
EMMK.
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donations from concerned citizens).2 47 As a result, private governance entities
may overcome some of the practical impediments to information diffusion and
thus to laboratory federalism.
In fact, some private governance entities are perfectly situated to improve
laboratory federalism because they are designed to encourage state policy ex-
perimentation and to catalyze the subsequent dissemination of successful public
policy innovations. STRONGER, for instance, surveys and assesses the success
of the various state risk-regulation approaches. As described above,2 48
STRONGER first promotes its suite of regulatory options to states and then
returns with a state report card and suggestions for improvement. To date,
STRONGER has only reviewed hydraulic fracturing regulations in six states-
Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Ohio, and Pennsylvania 249-and its
recommendations are fairly narrow and targeted. 50 With only a slight shift in
its operating model, though, the organization could first identify and then pro-
mote the spread of effective regulatory approaches, by helping states determine
which sister-state approaches are more (or less) successful in practice and
under what conditions. In other words, STRONGER could serve Wiseman's
critical (but presently underperformed) function of maintaining a clearinghouse
of information on state laws and industry performance standards, "[t]o assist
states in identifying the best regulatory options, ... remind the laggards of
areas where improvement is needed and demonstrate the many variations in
risk response. ' '2 51
Yet there are important caveats to this rosy view about the workings of
private governance entities. First, private governance regimes face a compli-
ance conundrum. As noted earlier, such regimes sometimes rely on voluntary
reporting to assess compliance. Yet, participants may seek to derive the benefits
of nominal participation without actually improving their performance.252 This
problem can persist even after the privately generated approach is adopted into
public law, if the public law regime lacks a robust compliance-assessment pro-
tocol or has limited funds to assess compliance.
For an information-gathering entity like FracFocus, for example, the chal-
lenge is to encourage voluntary, honest, and complete disclosure of information
about drilling practices. Several factors may limit or bias disclosures. First, as
noted above, companies may be concerned about giving up a competitive ad-
vantage by disclosing (allegedly) proprietary information, such as the identity
and quantity of the compounds in the slickwater used for hydraulic fractur-
247 Snyder, supra note 238, at 730.
248 See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
249 Past Reviews, STATE REvIEw OF OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGULATIONS, http://perma.cc/
32BR-A5DW.
250 See, e.g., STATE REVIEW OF OIL & NATURAL GAS ENVTL. REGULATIONS, COLORADO HYDRAU-
LIC FRACTURING STATE REviaw 6 (2011), http://perma.cc[U6AH-72S3 (recommending that the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission "consider whether establishing a maximum sur-
face casing depth may be in order to prevent well control or cementing problems").
251 See Wiseman, supra note 30, at 179.252 See generally Darnall & Sides, supra note 18.
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ing.253 Second, with respect to non-proprietary information, while companies
may have an incentive to disclose information that paints them in a positive
light, they have no incentive to disclose inculpatory or otherwise damaging
information about their practices. Third, some useful information-such as
baseline surface water and groundwater quality prior to drilling-may be ex-
pensive to obtain. Companies are unlikely to invest in this research if they have
any reason to fear that the resulting information will be used against them in
court. Finally, even if there is some public pressure to disclose, the public is
likely to be satisfied with partial disclosures. This is the central conundrum of
an information imbalance-the party in the know can buy considerable good-
will by disclosing some information, while the less-well-informed party can
never be sure she is receiving true and complete answers to her questions.
In the absence of additional requirements, FracFocus gives participating
companies the ability to tout their transparency without guaranteeing that their
disclosures are complete and accurate.21 4 As a result, some "disclosures,"
which refer only to hydraulic fracturing chemicals' brand names and not their
"proprietary" ingredients or reactive properties, are more notable for what they
hide than what they reveal. 255
A second limitation to private governance is that private entities are by no
means immune to the problems that plague public governance. Indeed, as
Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein have argued, beneficial private govern-
ance may itself-somewhat ironically-amount to an under-produced public
good, because private entities cannot fully realize the economic or reputational
benefits of their efforts. 256
For example, an entity like CSSD, which works to develop best practices
for hydraulic fracturing, may try to promote its standards to industry as a shield
against future tort liability. 257 Yet CSSD cannot guarantee that result, precisely
because its standards are voluntary. An industry defendant could point to its
conformance to CSSD's standards as evidence that it took "due care," but it
probably could not argue that its conformance to those standards preempted its
tort liability (as the mere existence of state or federal regulatory requirements
253 See How to Read a Fracturing Record, supra note 215.
254 In practice, an individual state could choose to utilize FracFocus but also to make third-party
verification a part of its disclosure mandate.
25 See, e.g., Snyder Bros., Inc., Hydraulic Fracturing Fluid Product Component Information Dis-
closure, Robert A Zaborowski #1M-47.5 Well, API # 37-019-21822, Fracture date 7/24/2012,
FRACFOCUS, http://perma.cc/WMW9-ZMAY (disclosing the use of "iron control," "scale con-
trol," and "acid corrosion inhibitor," but providing little additional information about the proper-
ties or "proprietary" components of those additives).
256 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 21, at 525. But see Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 166-70
(explaining that "[s]everal attributes" of private certification and labeling systems have made it
relatively easy for such systems to overcome the "second-order collective action problem" that
could, in theory, dissuade private entities from developing functioning private governance
regimes).
257 See Saltzman, supra note 239, at 6.
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sometimes does25 ). CSSD could, of course, attempt to increase the legal import
of its standards by pushing states or federal agencies to codify them-but on
that front, the group would likely run into significant political opposition from
industry, which may well have supported the standards precisely because they
were advertised as an alternative to, rather than a model for, government regu-
lation. Further, if some government entity did adopt CSSD's standards, the
group would lose its "intellectual property rights in [its] creations"259-and, in
turn, lose at least some ability to profit from those creations, either directly
(through charging for standards manuals or for performance evaluations) or
indirectly (through charitable donations).
Moreover, private governance entities also face an issue of scale. Several
authors have suggested that shale gas regulation is best undertaken at the state
or local level, in part because shale gas risks vary with the geology and geogra-
phy of the drilling site, which requires regulatory efforts to be "tailored to local
conditions. ' '260 This raises concerns for both public and private efforts to de-
velop best practices, but the problem is most severe for private entities, which
take advantage of shared interests across regulatory jurisdictions-an advan-
tage that loses its import if standards must vary with local conditions. In other
words, the more one believes that unconventional gas extraction policy must be
developed by entities familiar with local geography and geology, the less of an
advantage large and geographically unconstrained private organizations have in
developing that policy.
Private governance entities may also lack adequate incentives to revisit
and refine their chosen approach. They are nimble and quick to innovate, but
having innovated, they may prove even more resistant to policy change than
public entities, which are driven to revisit past policy choices every election
cycle. For example, FracFocus quickly appeared on the scene and developed its
information platform, but has been slow to respond to critiques of that platform.
The problem is even greater if the private governance approach creates reliance
interests that make participating industry players resistant to change or modifi-
cation of the existing scheme. 261 In the case of a privately developed standards
regime, for example, standards intended to provide a floor might quickly be-
come a ceiling, discouraging the development of improved practices and tech-
nologies to reduce gas risks.
258 See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Ap-
proach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 454-76 (2008) (surveying Supreme Court jurisprudence on
regulatory preemption).
259 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 21, at 525.
260 Merrill & Schizer, supra note 32, at 15 1. See also Spence, supra note 77, at 492-93, 508.
261 On the other hand, some authors have suggested that if the private governance scheme is cre-
ated and administered by an entity separate and distinct from the industry-such as a trade associ-
ation-the association might have incentives to revise and refine the rules even if the industry
players oppose that renovation, because each time the association updates the rules, it generates a
new product (the revised rulebook) that it can market to its industry members. Snyder, supra note
238, at 730 (offering a hypothetical scenario in which the standard-setting organization's interests
would favor rule revisions even "at the expense of [organization] members").
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Further, there is an argument that some of the same factors that could be
used to attract industry support for privately developed standards could, con-
versely, make industry players wary about participating in a voluntary stan-
dards-development effort in the first place. For example, industry players may
be concerned that the effort will result in standards (1) that immediately be-
come the baseline for "due care" in the industry,2 2 (2) that banks and insurance
companies adopt as prerequisites for provision of financial loans or liability
insurance, 263 or (3) that states adopt and render binding. Indeed, it appears that
CSSD may have encountered this reluctance in attempting to build a broad
coalition of strategic partners to support the Center's standards development
work. Thus far, only four of the top ten production companies operating in
Pennsylvania have agreed to work with the Center. 264 Others were invited to
join, but declined. 26s STRONGER, too, faces buy-in problems: states may not
choose to undergo review in the first place, and even when they do, they have
no obligation to adopt all of the review team's recommendations. 6
Another problem with private governance relates to process. Privately de-
veloped standards raise issues of openness, fairness, and accountability, partic-
ularly if there is a risk that industry players may seek to use the standards-
development process to advance anticompetitive interests, or if the industry
hopes to use compliance as evidence that its practices meet some externally
defined social goal (such as the promotion of environmental sustainability,
worker safety, or fair labor conditions). 2 67
262 See, e.g,, Merrill & Schizer, supra note 32, at 201-28; Maxwell J. Mehiman, Professional
Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1165, 1224 (2012) (criticizing
proposals to use medical practice guidelines as "safe harbors" to insulate physicians from mal-
practice liability).
263 Many global banks, for example, have adopted the Equator Principles, "a set of environmental
assessment and disclosure requirements" that apply to project finance borrowers that seek loans
over ten million dollars. Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 151. "Project finance lending by [Equator
Principle] member banks [now] accounts for more than 70% of global project finance lending in
developing countries." Id. at 152.
264 Kevin Begos, Center for Sustainable Shale Development Fracking Coalition Upsets Environ-
mentalists, Drillers, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 7, 2013), http://perma.cc/3QFV-SV64.
265 Kevin Begos, Fracking Coalition Upsets Both Greens and Drillers, AP (Apr. 7, 2013), http://
perma.cc/LYK6-FJV5.
266 As of July 2013, the STRONGER website indicated that STRONGER teams had reviewed and
critiqued twenty-two state programs; "[d]uring the summer of 2009, all states that ha[d] been
reviewed were surveyed to determine the status of implementation of [STRONGER's] recommen-
dations .... Of the 593 recommendations to the 16 states that responded, 194 (33%) were de-
scribed as fully implemented, 161 (27%) as partially implemented, 157 (26%) as outstanding and
82 (14%) as unknown." State Reviews: The Process, STATE REVIEW OF OIL & NATURAL GAS
ENVTL. REGULATIONS, http://perma.ccY8KT-YSMN.
267 See, e.g., Jason Morrison & Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Private and Quasi-Private Standard Setting,
in Tim OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 498, 520 (Daniel Bodansky
et al. eds., 2007) (noting, for example, that "[t]here is . . . an inherent tendency for private
standards to be, overall, less stringent than public ones covering the same subject matter"); Free-
man, supra note 23, at 642 (noting that historically, "[li]arger firms tended to exert a dispropor-
tionate influence over standards that often ensured favorable treatment for their products"); James
W. Singer, Who Will Set the Standards for Groups That Set Industry Product Standards?, 12
NAT'L J. 721 (1980).
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There is no way to measure the reality of industry capture, of course, but
standards developed by an industry-dominated private entity are likely to hew
closely to the industry's preferred approach, at some expense to more publicly
oriented ideas. Even more concerning is that this can happen even if the private
group is committed to avoiding policy capture. As Wendy Wagner has demon-
strated in the context of agency rulemaking, for example, the Administrative
Procedure Act's provisions that require agencies to involve the public in policy
development had the "unintended consequence[ ]" of creating "information
capture":
[A] continuous barrage of letters, telephone calls, meetings, follow-
up memoranda, formal comments, post-rule comments, petitions for
reconsideration, and notices of appeal from knowledgeable interest
groups over the life cycle of a rulemaking can have a "machine-gun"
effect on overstretched agency staff .... To make matters worse, as
the issues grow more numerous and technical, less well-financed in-
terest groups find it hard to continue participating in the process....
Yet as their engagement wanes, so does the pluralistic engine consid-
ered so fundamental to the administrative process. They can no
longer provide a means of culling out extraneous information and
other chaff from the rulemaking through their vigorous
engagement.268
Worse still, Wagner continues, "[ujnlike the older conceptions of capture that
depend fundamentally on the vulnerability of the hearts, minds, and stamina of
agency staff to special interests, information capture flourishes even when
agency officials are determined to resist this pressure. 2 69
In the context of private governance, the problems of ideological and in-
formational capture are compounded by the public perception of bias. The in-
dustry players in the natural gas world are so large and wealthy, and their
incentives so clearly aligned toward resource development, that as soon as in-
dustry takes a seat at the table, the public is likely to perceive the entire private
governance effort as irreversibly tainted. The Sierra Club, for example, dubbed
CSSD's efforts to develop guidelines "'akin to slapping a Band-Aid on a gap-
ing wound,' and a coalition of grass-roots groups . . . claimed that [any plan
developed by the Center would] 'simply put[ ] green lipstick on a pig."' 27 0 As
a result, even if a private governance entity attempts to reduce industry influ-
ence by involving outside groups in its policy development effort-as ASTM
International has tried to do-it may have trouble attracting such groups to the
table.
And that is not the only hurdle that stands in the way of process reforms.
For one thing, even large NGOs that are well staffed and amply funded to
268 Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DuKE L.J.
1321, 1325 (2010).
2691d. at 1326.
270 Begos, supra note 264.
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weigh in on public rulemaking efforts may encounter staffing and funding limi-
tations that restrict their ability to follow the myriad activities of private indus-
try groups and respond to each group's proposed standards. Then too, public
process may be cost-prohibitive for the private governance entity itself. The
very act of opening decisionmaking to public process (and perhaps even adding
some sort of back-end process by which interested parties could appeal compli-
ance determinations or ask the entity to revisit or revise its standards, as inter-
ested parties can now petition agencies to reconsider rules) would tie private
entities in knots. Decisions that can now be made quickly and nimbly with the
backing of membership would drag on for decades just as controversial agency
rulemakings now do.27' In other words, increasing the transparency and objec-
tivity of private entities' decision-making processes might well destroy the very
advantage these entities now have over their public counterparts.
Indeed, these observations about the challenges facing any effort to reform
private entities' governance procedures may help explain why, although "many
standard-setting organizations have taken steps to ensure compliance with due
process, and have opened their meetings to public view," '272 others continue to
"appear secretive, industry-dominated, and rife with the potential for anticom-
petitive behavior. 273
IV. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC GAS GOVERNANCE
Gas governance entities illustrate the developing theory of private envi-
ronmental governance, including both the promise and pitfalls of relying on
private solutions to serious public risks. In addition, though, the entities offer a
window into the ways that private governance efforts can either foster or im-
pede the development of successful public governance regimes. Specifically,
on the positive side, such entities can serve as a "means of experimenting with
policy options ... at low risk to policymakers, 274 or of strengthening "legality
verification" and thereby supplementing otherwise inadequate public enforce-
ment.275 On the negative side, however, private entities may compete for lim-
ited advocacy dollars and time, or dilute public demand for government efforts
to mitigate risks.276
271 See, e.g., Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can
Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1381, 1384-85 (2011) (documenting lengthy delays in agency action).
272 Freeman, supra note 23, at 642. As Freeman notes: "[ASTMI has become a pseudoagency,
with 'balanced' committees and sub-committees comprised of representatives with different inter-
ests whose responsibility is to draft standards, a central staff to monitor their work, and an appeals
process to ensure compliance with procedures. Undeniably, technical committees still frequently
fail to include sufficient consumer, small business, and labor interests, and committees may con-
tinue to be driven primarily by economic concerns, but they have moved in the direction of open-
ness and balanced representation." Id.
273 Id.
274 Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 188.
275 Id. at 162.
276 Id. at 187.
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Assessing the degree to which API and the other private gas governance
entities may be contributing to these positive or negative "spillover effects" '277
on public governance is a difficult task, particularly at this early stage in the
development of gas governance. As a first step in that assessment, this Part
supposes an ideal model for public gas governance-specifically, a cooperative
federalism regime, along the lines suggested by Professor Jody Freeman and
others278-and then considers whether private gas governance efforts are mov-
ing us closer to that ideal. Importantly though, the purpose of this Article is not
to advocate for a cooperative federalism regime, nor to suggest that private
governance entities are more likely to promote cooperative federalism than any
other public regime. Rather, this Article is simply using cooperative federalism
as one of many possible public governance "targets," and then attempting to
assess whether the plethora of private gas governance entities seem likely to
bring us closer to or farther from that hypothetical end target.
The basic outline of a cooperative federalism regime is as follows: (1) the
federal government sets minimum requirements, preferably in the form of gen-
eral "performance standards," such as "zero discharge," that require the
achievement of a specified degree of risk reduction; (2) the states then have the
primary role in implementing those standards, or even choosing to exceed
them; but (3) the federal government can step in if states fail to achieve the
national minima. In the natural gas context, the federal government could set
standards for, e.g., information disclosure, drilling site identification (including
groundwater testing), well construction, water consumption, and wastewater
treatment. As Professor Freeman notes,279 a cooperative federalism program
like this exists in many familiar environmental laws, including-most relevant
to the natural gas context-in the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
of 1977.280
The below discussion first details the ways that private governance entities
have already advanced or could advance progress toward a cooperative federal-
ism regime for natural gas governance. Part IV.B then considers some ways
that these entities could impede such progress or, perhaps worse, taint the even-
tual regime.
A. The Positive Story
The most significant roles that private entities can play in advancing the
goal of a cooperative federalism regime are to (a) collect information about
natural gas risks; (b) help catalog the risks; (c) identify alternative production
practices (in the form of a list of "best practices") that would reduce the risks;
(d) assist in creation and adoption of federal standards (either directly or by
277 Id.
278 See Freeman, supra note 82.
279 Id.
280 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2012).
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smoothing public opposition to such a move); and (e) assist in state implemen-
tation of those standards (again, either directly or indirectly).
Taking on many of these tasks requires two traits that, thus far, federal and
most state governments appear to lack: (1) the ability to act on these conten-
tious issues without raising the ire of either the electorate or the industry (or in
spite of that ire); and (2) a deep understanding of existing industry practices,
the risks posed by those practices, and the availability and efficacy of alterna-
tive approaches. As noted above, private entities have already been quite suc-
cessful in collecting information on shale gas risks and in developing standards
to address those risks. These successes suggest that such entities are less ham-
strung than government officials by the political debates around gas
development.
FracFocus, for example, has made great strides in information collection.
Presumably, the website has had this success in part because it offers an en-
tirely voluntary disclosure platform and does not review or police those disclo-
sures in any way. Disclosing drilling practices on FracFocus is thus a win-win
for industry players-they can tout their openness and earn public goodwill
while continuing to keep business information confidential, all without expos-
ing themselves to any kind of regulatory penalties for incomplete or inaccurate
compliance .28
The next step in development of a cooperative federalism regime is to use
the newly gathered information about the industry to identify a workable (that
is, cost-effective) set of national performance standards. Here, too, private enti-
ties have a head start. As private governance theory explains, groups like API,
ASTM, CSSD, and GAPP are well positioned to get out ahead in the develop-
ment of gas extraction standards. Take API, for example: the Institute has been
in the business of developing standards for decades, and its members, including
many of the largest oil and gas companies,282 know the industry inside and out.
Moreover, as noted above, unlike government entities, industry trade groups
like API may have the affirmative support of their membership when they work
to identify a suite of gas extraction best practices, whether because voluntarily
adopted standards can price non-compliant competitors out 6f the market or
because such standards insulate against command-and-control regulation.283
Indeed, as noted above, industry might well suppose that a privately devel-
oped set of standards would provide some protection against federal or state
adoption of contrary or more stringent standards. Any federal or state actor who
discovers that standards and/or a compliance regime already exist in the private
28 See Mike Soraghan, Hydraulic Fracturing: FracFocus Straining Under Heavy Use as BLM
Weighs Disclosure, ENERGYWIRE (Sept. 6, 2013), http://perma.cc/87CA-PP6H ("An industry
group, the Independent Petroleum Association of America, stressed its support for FracFocus even
as it said the rule [requiring disclosures] was duplicative and unnecessary. 'FracFocus strikes the
proper balance between substantial disclosure of additives used in hydraulic fracturing operations
and protection of trade secrets service suppliers develop to improve the quality and safety of those
operations,' wrote IPAA's Dan Naatz and Kathleen Sgamma.").282 API Member Companies, AM. PETROL. INST., http://perma.cc/MH2A-9E7M.
283 See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Strategic Partners, CTR. FOR
SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., http://perma.cc/K4EE-W8LF.
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sector is likely to favor public adoption of the privately developed system over
development of new public standards for at least two reasons. First, the difficult
work of political buy-in has already been done. Second, the privately developed
standards may come with a built-in compliance regime, whereas newly devel-
oped standards would require the jurisdiction to develop its own standards and
then develop and fund its own inspection and enforcement procedures. Indeed,
the White House Office of Management and Budget expressly supports federal
adoption of existing private standards "to eliminate costs associated with devel-
opment of new standards" and "to work toward harmonization of standards. 28 4
This policy should reassure industry actors that if they support creation of a
privately developed sustainability program, they are unlikely to be blindsided
by federal adoption of some inconsistent set of standards.
At the same time, the private governance players in the natural gas world
are well situated to facilitate adoption of private standards by public entities.
STRONGER, in particular, is deliberately set up to help states strengthen their
regulation of oil and gas practices.285 If STRONGER were interested in promot-
ing the standards that underlie a particular, privately developed standardized
regime, it could simply use those standards as its guidelines for evaluating ex-
isting state practices. States whose existing practices paralleled those that un-
derlie the regime would receive a good report from STRONGER; those whose
regulations diverged from the regime would receive suggestions from
STRONGER about how to bring their regulatory programs in line with that
regime.
As noted above, states would also have an added incentive to conform:
conformity would enable them to use the privately developed program and its
independent verification protocol as a hassle-free and relatively cheap method
of assessing industry's compliance with the state standards. Further, the in-
volvement of industry-backed private entities like API could reduce the politi-
cal backlash for states that choose to adopt the standards developed or endorsed
by that entity. If, later, numerous states were on board with one set of such
standards, that interstate harmony would ease the process of pushing through
the uniform federal standards that form the backbone of a cooperative federal-
ism regime. Finally, STRONGER could also ease other states' later implemen-
tation of those federal standards by using its state review process to help
identify and spread successful and cost-effective state implementation
strategies.
B. Negative Spillover Effects
There are also reasons to be concerned that private governance efforts
could negatively impact development of a cooperative federalism regime. First,
there is a risk that the sheer proliferation of privately developed standards could
slow or even thwart development of a single set of national standards. As noted
284 Schindler, supra note 190, at 314.
281 See supra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.
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above, 86 the private standards under development in the natural gas world vary
widely. But in the absence of a market-which can arise for some kinds of
product standards 2 t7-private governance efforts have no means of jockeying
for position. They can experiment with standards development, but they lack
any means to assert that their standards should take precedence over any other
entity's standards. Each set of standards is likely to have a set of NGO, indus-
try, and perhaps also state backers, and this factionalization may make it diffi-
cult for interest groups and policymakers to agree to back any one set of
standards for national adoption.
The form of the various privately developed standards could also create
problems for anyone working to develop a cooperative federalism regime. Such
regimes are most effective if the national minima take the form of performance
standards-for example, CSSD's recommendation that "[o]perators shall de-
sign and install casing and cement to completely isolate the well and all drilling
and produced fluids from surface waters and aquifers.""28 National performance
standards like this one give each state the necessary flexibility to develop tech-
nically varied implementation strategies that best reflect climatic, hydrologic,
geologic, and perhaps also economic and political conditions in the state. Yet,
some of the private gas governance groups are developing technically specific
standards that require the use of a particular technology or adherence to a speci-
fied drilling approach. If the eventual national standards took this more direc-
tive form, there would be little remaining room for states to realize
performance improvements and cost savings by developing individualized im-
plementation strategies.
A different set of negative spillover effects relates to the process used by
private groups to develop their information platforms or drilling standards.
Concerns about the process of private standards development are most press-
ing, of course, when government entities adopt the standards as binding public
law-either expressly or by reference.289 In that context, the legitimacy of the
resulting public standards depends in large part on the private standards body's
ability to "meet various criteria of transparency, democracy, notice, . . . an
opportunity for voice and exit, and [some guarantee that the body is] not domi-
nated ... by the regulated industry. ' 290 As noted above, some private groups
have begun to make procedural reforms to increase transparency, openness, and
286 See supra Part II.B.3.
287 See generally, e.g., Snyder, supra note 238.
288 CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., supra note 177, at 4.
289 For a discussion of the particular concerns raised when standards are incorporated by reference,
see, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 497, 498 (2013). "Simplified, universal access to law is one of the important transfor-
mations worked by the digital age . . . . Lagging behind this development, however, has been
computer access to standards developed by private standards development organizations, often
under the umbrella of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), and then converted by
agency actions incorporating them by reference into legal obligations. To discover what colors the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requires for use in work-place caution
signs, one must purchase from ANSI the standard OSHA has referenced in its regulations, at the
grice ANSI chooses to charge for it." Id.
°See Schindler, supra note 190, at 317.
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fairness, but there are reasons to question the efficacy of these reforms, and
some groups remain quite insular and at least potentially biased toward the
interests of their members. 29'
Finally, the contours of developing private governance regimes may dis-
tort the eventual public regime. Borrowing a term from a different environmen-
tal governance context, this can be described as a "problem of fit. ' ' 29 2 Because
private organizations' goals may differ somewhat from those of public officials
in particular jurisdictions, an information platform or set of standards devel-
oped by a private entity may be excessively or insufficiently restrictive when
adopted without modification as a solution to a public governance problem.
FracFocus offers a ready example: its off-the-shelf disclosure platform cannot
be individually tailored to match each state's on-the-books disclosure require-
ments. Thus, one author concludes that the "[u]se of FracFocus . . . appears to
reduce compliance with some state reporting requirements," because the web-
site "contains [data] fields for only a very limited subset of the information
that state disclosure rules [purport to] require. '293 Another notes that FracFocus
does not solicit such seemingly important information as the distance from the
gas well to surrounding-and hence at-risk-surface waterbodies.2 94 States that
use FracFocus as their platform for information collection lose the opportunity
to collect this information, which may in turn limit their ability to address well-
to-surface water contamination.2 95 Moreover, states that use FracFocus may find
themselves at the mercy of the company's technical and business decisions,
ranging from upgrades or other modifications of the platform, to decisions
about where and for how long to store companies' data, to choices about
whether to charge fees for access and even whether to stay in business.
CONCLUSION
Federal, state, and regional governments' slow response to the risks of un-
conventional gas extraction has created a conspicuous governance gap and an
opportunity for private governance entities to proliferate and innovate. These
entities' real-time efforts offer a case study for the developing theory of private
29' See Freeman, supra note 23. See also supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
2 9 2 ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FIT,
INTERPLAY, AND SCALE 20 (2002).
293McFEELEY, supra note 117, at 8 (emphasis added). See also KATE KONSCHNIK ET AL.,
HARVARD LAW SCH. ENVTL. LAW PROGRAM POLICY INITIATIVE, LEGAL FRACTURES IN CHEMICAL
DISCLOSURE LAWS: WHY THE VOLUNTARY CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY FRACFOcus FAILS
AS A REGULATORY COMPLIANCE TOOL (2013), http://perma.cc/4KHH-9U9L.
294 Wiseman, supra note 25, at 66.
295 On the other hand, Hannah Wiseman has noted that lawmakers can sometimes use their influ-
ence to induce changes in private governance regimes. "Colorado, for example, provides that if by
2013 FracFocus 'does not allow the Commission staff and the public to sort the registry for Colo-
rado information by geographic area [and various other characteristics,]' or 'there is no reasonable
assurance that the registry will allow for such searches,' then operators must [instead] use elec-
tronic forms created by the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission." Id. at 54 (quoting 2
COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205A(b)(3)(A), (B) (2012)). In theory at least, the potential loss of
influence that this would cause may convince FracFocus to modify its private disclosure approach.
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environmental governance. On the one hand, one can understand private enti-
ties as fulfilling the information collection and policy experimentation roles
once assigned to states. The efforts of FracFocus, API, STRONGER, and the
other private entities at work in the natural gas world partially support this
model. These entities have been able to act quickly to develop and promulgate
the information platforms and risk mitigation standards so conspicuously ab-
sent from federal and most state regulatory regimes.
At the same time, these entities' efforts illuminate the serious shortcom-
ings of private governance, some of which become particularly obvious when
one evaluates the work these organizations could do to advance progress to-
ward adoption of a public governance regime, such as a cooperative federalism
regime. First, the entities offer the possibility of paper compliance without the
assurance of enforcement-so called "greenwashing." Second, their work may
distort rather than complement or enhance the development and operation of
federal and state regulatory regimes.
Third, unless the groups are careful to open their efforts to balanced repre-
sentation, their work is likely to suffer from industry bias, which may be diffi-
cult to surmount in the private context. Even large and wealthy public interest
groups that are well structured to participate in public rulemakings are unlikely
to be staffed and funded to participate equally in private governance efforts.
Moreover, perceived bias may deter outside groups from participating in pri-
vate governance efforts even if they are invited to do so. No matter what pro-
cess reforms private entities undertake, therefore, they may not hear from a
representative sample of outside interests.
Finally, there is a serious problem of scale: on the one hand, if the particu-
lar nature of the problem requires that standards be tailored to local conditions,
then private groups may lose their procedural advantage. On the other hand, if
the ultimate goal is to move toward national uniformity, then the absence of a
widely accepted rule to identify the supremacy of any particular set of private
standards could well prove fatal to private governance efforts.
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APPENDIX
PRIVATELY DEVELOPED NATURAL GAS STANDARDS
Overview of API standards for hydraulic fracturing: http://perma.cc/LTU7-
HFPF.
Proposed new ASTM standards for hydraulic fracturing:
" New Guide for Sampling and Analysis of Residential and Commercial
Water Supply Wells (WK42923): http://perma.cc/4JTM-WL55.
• New Test Method for Determining the Crush Resistance of Materials
Used as Proppants in Hydraulic Fracturing of Subsurface Formations
(WK44896): http://perma.cc/P5XT-L5KW.
• New Test Method for Standard Test Method for Dynamic Image Analy-
sis of Natural Sand, Resin Coated Sand, Ceramic and Other Manufac-
tured Materials Used as Proppants (WK42600): http://perma.cc/7K59-
Q62V.
* New Guide for Data Management and Reporting Associated with Shale
Oil and Gas Hydraulic Fracturing Operations (WK42803): http://perma
.cc/96E4-3T8V.
CSSD performance standards for hydraulic fracturing: http://perma.cc/
Y6M6-Q78U.
STRONGER hydraulic fracturing guidelines: http://perma.cc/64L-LMBJ.
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